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Abstract
This article has examined more than half a century of operation of provincial and territorial hate speech
laws in Canada. This examination has confirmed that free speech sensitivity has long been an integral
and enduring feature of the administration and interpretation of legislative regimes for the regulation of
hate speech—a finding that should come as a shock to no-one. What is surprising is the way in which free
speech sensitivity has impacted on the operation of hate speech laws, and the effects of that influence on
the quality of the protection provided to victims by existing provincial and territorial laws.... One of the
chief objectives of hate speech prohibitions in provincial and territorial human rights statutes is to draw a
line between free speech which must be protected (or at least tolerated), and hate speech which must be
outlawed and sanctioned because of its harmful effects. Such line-drawing exercises are never simple
and almost always controversial. However, the extent of the uncertainty and controversy has been
exacerbated in Canada by the multi-layered influences of free speech sensitivity described above, as well
as ongoing differences amongst decisionmakers regarding the legitimate scope of hate speech
prohibitions. The net result is that the contours of unlawful hate speech in Canada are anything but sharp.
On the contrary, the boundary between free speech and hate speech remains contested and fluid.
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NEGOTIATING THE CONTOURS OF UNLAWFUL HATE
SPEECH: REGULATION UNDER PROVINCIAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAWS IN CANADA*
Luke McNamara**
1. INTRODUCTION

Academic writing and media commentary on Canadian hate speech laws has focused
heavily on the offences created by the Criminal Code1and the restrictions in the
Canadian Human Rights Act on telephonic communication of hate messages.2 In both
cases, this intensity of interest has been prompted by a range of factors including the
national operation of these laws, their mobilization against well-known and attention
seeking racist organisations and individuals, and the fact that the Supreme Court of
Canada has been called upon to rule on the constitutional validity and interpretation of
both federal statutes. Consequently, there is a substantial body of academic writing on

*The research upon which this article is based has a long history. It began with the support of a 1994
Canadian Studies Faculty Research Program grant, and continued in 1998 during a sabbatical visit to
Dalhousie Law School. Further research was completed in 2002 during a visit to Manitoba Law
School, which was made possible by grants from the Law Society of NSW Legal Scholarship Support
Fund and the Legal Research Institute, Faculty of Law, University of Manitoba. Special thanks to:
Professor DT Anderson, Chair of the Legal Research Institute; Professor Harvey Secter, Dean of the
Faculty of Law; Professor John Eaton, Law Librarian; and Rhian Opel, who provided valuable research
assistance. Finally, this article was completed during my time as a Visiting Professor at the Irish Centre
for Human Rights, National University of Ireland, Galway in 2004. I would also like to thank the staff
from human rights agencies across Canada who were consistently helpful in answering my questions
and identifying and providing copies of relevant decisions.
**BA, LLB (UNSW), LLM (Manitoba), PhD (Wollongong). Associate Professor, Faculty of Law,
University of Wollongong, Australia. Email: lukem@uow.edu.au.
1 Canadian Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s.318-319. See e.g. StefanBraun Democracy Off
Balance: Freedom of Expression and Hate Propaganda Law in Canada (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2004); Sanjeev Anand, “Expressions of Racial Hatred and Criminal Law: Proposals for
Reform” (1997) 40 Criminal Law Quarterly 215; and Senaka K. Suriya, Combatting Hate?: A SocioLegal Discussion on the Criminalization of Hate in Canada (Ottawa: Department of Law, Carleton
University, 1998).
2 Canadian Human Rights Act R.S.C. 1977, s.13. See, for example, Chris Gosnell. “Hate Speech on
the Internet: A Question of Context” (1998) 23 Queen’s L.J. 369; Eddie Taylor, “Hanging up on Hate:
Contempt of Court as a Tool to Shut Down Hatelines” (1995) 5 National Journal of Constitutional Law
163; and John L. Finlay & Brian Smith, “The Canadian Liberty Net Litigation: A Prototype for the
Regulation of Hate Speech on the Internet” (Paper presented to the Hatred in Canada: Perspectives,
Action, and Prevention Conference, University of Victoria, 18-18 September 1998) [unpublished on
file with author].
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the decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada in R v. Keegstra3 and Taylor v.
Canadian Human Rights Commission,4 focusing on the Court’s resolution of the
tension between the protection afforded to freedom of expression under the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms5 and the criminalization of hate speech under the
Criminal Code.6
Comparatively little attention has been devoted to the operation of restrictions
on various forms of hate speech contained in the human rights statutes of almost all
Canadian provinces and territories. And yet, provincial hate speech laws have a long
history in Canada and have been invoked on a number of occasions in efforts to
restrict and/or sanction conduct by individuals or groups that promotes ill-feeling and
discrimination towards particular minorities, including Jews, Aboriginal people,
people of colour, and gays and lesbians.
The first judicial decision under a provincial hate speech law was handed down
in Manitoba in 1934,7 and in recent years, a series of hate speech cases have been
decided by tribunals and courts in British Columbia, Alberta and Saskatchewan.8
There is now a small but significant body of commission, tribunal and court decisions
on the scope of provincial hate speech laws which represent an important component

3 In R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697; [1991] 2 W.W.R. 1, the Court upheld the constitutional

validity of s.319 of the Criminal Code [Keegstra].
4 In Taylor v. Canadian Human Rights Commission, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 892; (1990), 75 D.L.R. (4th) 577,
the Court upheld the constitutional validity of s.13 of the Canadian Human Rights Act [Taylor].
5 Section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [Charter].
6 See e.g. Alan Borovoy, “How Not to Fight Racial Hatred” in David Schneiderman, ed., Freedom of
Expression and the Charter (Calgary: Thomson Professional Publishing Company, 1991) 243; Irwin
Cotler, “Principles and Perspectives on Hate Speech, Freedom of Expression and Non-Discrimination:
The Canadian Experience as a Case-Study in Striking a Balance” in Sandra Coliver, ed., Striking A
Balance: Hate Speech, Freedom of Expression and Non-Discrimination (London and Colchester:
Article 19, International Centre Against Censorship and Human Rights Centre, University of Essex,
1992) 123; Bruce P. Elman, “Combatting Racist Speech: The Canadian Experience” (1994) 32 Alta. L.
Rev. 623; Terry Heinrichs, “Censorship as Free Speech! Free Expression, Values and the Logic of
Silencing in R v. Keegstra (1998) 36(4) Alta. L. Rev. 835; Richard Moon, “Drawing Lines in a Cultural
of Prejudice: R v. Keegstra and the Restriction of Hate Propaganda” (1992) 26(1) U.B.C. L. Rev.;
Derek Raymaker & David Kilgour, “The Freedom to Promote Hate: What We Learned from Jim
Keegstra and Malcolm Ross” (1992) U.N.B.L.J. 327; Tasmin Solomon, “Antisemitism as Free Speech:
Judicial Responses to Hate Propaganda in Zundel and Keegstra” (1995) 13(1) Australian-Canadian
Studies 1; Lorraine E. Weinrib, “Hate Promotion in a Free and Democratic Society: R. v. Keegstra”
(1991) 36 McGill L.J. 1416; Jeffrey I. Ross, “Hate Crime in Canada: Growing Pains in New
Legislation” in Mark S. Hamm ed., Hate Crime: International Perspectives on Causes and Control
(Cincinnati: ACJS/Anderson, 1994) 159; Ian McKenna, “Canada’s Hate Propaganda Laws—A
Critique” (1994) 9 British Journal of Canadian Studies 15.
7 Tobias v. Whittaker (13 February 1935), (Manitoba Court of King’s Bench) [Tobias].
8 See infra notes 344, 120, 334, 292, 278, 250 respectively.
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of the Canadian legal system’s attempts to delineate the boundary between unlawful
hate speech and lawful communication and expression.9
The dominant theme in political debates, academic scholarship and appellate
court litigation on federal hate speech laws has been whether the legal regulation of
hate speech can be reconciled with the valued liberal democratic principle that all
citizens are entitled to exercise ‘free speech’ or ‘free expression’. In legal terms, these
debates have often been assumed to focus on the question of the validity of legislative
restrictions on hate speech in light of the Charter. And yet, a challenge to the validity
of legislation is only the most extreme manifestation of the impact of free speech
arguments on the interpretation and application of legal restrictions on hate speech.
In recent research on racist hate speech laws in Australia10 I have adopted the
concept of ‘free speech sensitivity’11 to capture the full extent of the influence of free
speech rights and principles on the legal regulation of hate speech. That is, not only
expressly defined and protected legal and constitutional rights and associated inquiries
as to legislative validity, but also free speech political values, principles, rhetoric,
consciousness and preferences as to the relative breadth of valid legislative
restrictions. The phrase ‘free speech sensitivity’ is particularly appropriate in the
Australian legal and political context, where the ‘right’ of free speech does not have a
legislative or explicit constitutional source, but is primarily derived from and protected
by the common law.12 As a result there is considerable uncertainty about its precise
dimensions and attributes, as well as its implications for attempts to regulate
communicative behaviour. However, the concept of free speech sensitivity is also
valuable with reference to Canada, because as Richard Moon has observed, the
9 It is important to recognise that the board of inquiry/panel/tribunal/court decisions examined in this

article do not represent all matters in which complaints have been lodged alleging violation of
provincial/territorial restrictions on hate speech, but only those which were resolved by formal
adjudication, conciliation having been unsuccessful or deemed inappropriate by one or both of the
parties. By virtue of their public status, these decisions play a much more significant role in shaping the
contours of the free speech/hate speech boundary than the outcomes of conciliated complaints, which
are usually private and confidential, therefore making very little contribution to broader debates as to
where the line should be drawn. On the role of mediation in the human rights complaint context, see
generally, William Black & Philip Bryden “Mediation as a Tool for Resolving Human Rights Disputes:
An Evaluation of the BC Human Rights Commission's Early Mediation Project” (2004) 37(1) U.B.C.
L.Rev. 73.
10 Luke McNamara, Regulating Racism: Racial Vilification Laws in Australia (Sydney: Institute of
Criminology, University of Sydney, 2002) [McNamara].
11 After Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 2nd ed. (Minneola, NY: The Foundation Press,
1988) at 856. See McNamara, supra note 10 at 4-5.
12 See Lange v. ABC (1997) 189 C.L.R. 520 (High Court of Australia); and Michael Chesterman,
Freedom of Speech in Australian Law: A Delicate Plant (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000).
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expressly defined constitutional right to free speech is not synonymous with “freedom
of expression as a moral and political ideal”.13 The latter is a subset of the former, and
so the legally defined ‘right’ does not exhaust the political claim to uninhibited
communication that is advanced in a range of contexts.
In the Canadian legal system, one of the important sites for free speech
scrutiny of hate speech laws, both in terms of the validity of the legislation and the
breadth of the restriction imposed by the legislation, is the quasi-judicial and judicial
adjudication of complaints that provincial human rights laws dealing with hate speech
have been violated.
This article reports on a comprehensive examination of cases in which
tribunals, boards of inquiry and the courts have been called upon to adjudicate on
complaints of unlawful hate speech under provincial human rights statutes.14 The
primary objectives of this examination are to evaluate the contribution which
provincial tribunals, boards and courts have made to illuminating the boundary
between protected free speech and restricted hate speech in Canadian public discourse,
and to identify the impact that divergent and sometimes competing conceptions of
‘free speech sensitivity’ have had on the construction and positioning of the free
speech/hate speech boundary.
Part 2 of this article will provide a brief overview of existing provincial and
territorial human rights laws dealing with hate speech. In part 3, I will examine the
operation of the first and most common type of provincial/territorial legislation: a
narrow restriction on the public display of discriminatory signs and symbols. In part 4,
I will review the operation of the more controversial second type of legislation that has
been enacted in a number of jurisdictions: a broader restriction on public
communication which promotes hatred or other forms of ill-feeling towards a
particular group. Part 5 will draw together the main findings of my examination of
over 20 hate speech decisions, and summarise my conclusions on the way in which
provincial adjudicators have negotiated the contours of unlawful hate speech.
2. OVERVIEW OF PROVINCIAL AND TERRITORIAL LAWS

13 Richard Moon, The Constitutional Protection of Freedom of Expression (Toronto: University of

Toronto Press, 2000) at 3.
14 The review covers the period up to 31 March 2004.
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There are three main points of distinction between the different legislative
formulations that currently operate in Canadian provinces and territories:
i) Whether the legislation covers a broad range of methods of
communication or whether it is limited to the display of “signs and
symbols”;
ii) Whether the legislation defines the unlawful consequence in terms of
exposure to hatred/contempt or discrimination/intention to discriminate
(or both);
iii) The range of identified groups covered by the legislation.15
The primary focus of this article is on provincial legislative provisions that render
unlawful the promotion of hatred or contempt towards one or more identified groups
(or members of a group) by any one of a wide range of methods of communication.
Such hate speech laws currently operate in:
i) Saskatchewan under s.14 of the Saskatchewan Human Rights Code,
R.S.S. 1979, c. S-24.1 (since 1979, as amended in 1989);
ii) Alberta under s.2 of the Human Rights, Citizenship and
Multiculturalism Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. H-14 (since 1996);
iii) British Columbia under s.7 of the of the Human Rights Code,
R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 210 (since 1993);16
iv) Northwest Territories under s.13 of the Consolidation Of Human
Rights Act. R.S.N.W.T. 2002, c. 18 (since 2004).17

15 While the initial focus of early provincial human rights statutes was on racial or ethnic minorities, in

all jurisdictions the list of identified groups expanded incrementally in the latter decades of the 20th
century to include a range of groups who suffer discrimination.
16 See also the statutory tort created by the British Columbia Civil Rights Protection Act, R.S.B.C.
1996, c. 49 (discussed below).
17 This Act came into force July 1st, 2004. Section 13 of the Act provides:
(1) No person shall, on the basis of a prohibited ground of discrimination, publish or display or
cause or permit to be published or displayed any statement, notice, sign, symbol, emblem or
other representation that
(a) expresses or implies discrimination or any intention to discriminate against any individual or
class of individuals;
(b) incites or is calculated to incite others to discriminate against any individual or class of
individuals; or
(c) is likely to expose any individual or class of individuals to hatred or contempt.
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall be construed so as to interfere with the free expression of
opinion on any subject.
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A similar law also operated in Manitoba between 1976 and 1987.18
Human rights legislation in all other provincial or territorial jurisdictions
(except the Yukon Territory19) makes it unlawful to display any “notice, sign, symbol,
emblem, or other representation” which “indicates discrimination or an intention to
discriminate” against identified groups.20 The relevant laws are:
i) Manitoba: s.18 of the Human Rights Code R.S.M. 1987, c. H-175;
ii) New Brunswick: s.6 of the Human Rights Act R.S.N.B. 1985, c. 30;
iii) Newfoundland: s.14 of the Human Rights Code R.S.N.L. 1990, c.
H-14 ;
iv) Nova Scotia: s.7 of the Human Rights Act R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 214;
v) Nunavut: s.5 of the Fair Practices Act R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c. F-2, as
enacted for Nunavut pursuant to the Nunavut Act, R.S.C. 1993, c. 28;21
vi) Ontario: s.13 of the Human Rights Code R.S.O. 1990, c. H-19;
vii) Prince Edward Island: s.12 of the Human Rights Act R.S.P.E.I.
1988, c. H-12;
viii) Quebec: s.11 of the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and
Freedoms R.S.Q. 1975, c. C-12.
It may be questioned whether these laws should technically be categorised as
hate speech laws at all, given that they do not render unlawful the promotion of, or
exposure to, hatred or contempt as such. However, they have been included as part of
the ‘set’ of board/tribunal/court decisions examined for the purpose of this article for
18 Manitoba Human Rights Act, R.S.M. 1970, c. 104, s.2 (discussed below). See also the statutory tort

originally added to the Manitoba Libel Act, R.S.M. 1913, c. 143 in 1934, but now found in s.19 of the
Manitoba Defamation Act, R.S.M. 1987, c. D20 (discussed below).
19 A discriminatory signs and symbols prohibition was contained in s.5 of the Fair Practices
Ordinance, R.O.Y.T. 1971, c. F2, but was omitted from the Yukon’s Human Rights Act, R.S.Y. 1987,
c. 3, which superseded the Ordinance. At this time it was decided that it was not necessary to include
the conventional discriminatory signs and symbols prohibition or any form of restriction on hate speech
in the territorial human rights legislation, on the basis that hate speech and hate literature were already
regulated by the hate propaganda provisions of the Canadian Criminal Code (supra note 1) at s. 318319 (Letter from Pamela Muir, Department of Justice, Yukon Territorial Government (9 September
1999) personal communication). In 1998 the Yukon Human Rights Commission recommended that a
hate speech provision be added to the Human Rights Act 1987, but the government has not acted on
this recommendation (Letter from Heather MacFadgen, Director, Yukon Human Rights Commission
(21 January 2004) personal communication).
20 An equivalent provision is also found in s.12 of the Canadian Human Rights Act R.S.C. 1977, c. 33.
21 A NWT statute that was duplicated for Nunavut on April 1, 1999 according to s. 29 of the Nunavut
Act, R.S.C. 1993, c. 28. In November 2004 the Fair Practices Act 1988 will be replaced by the Human
Rights Act 2003, which includes a ‘standard’ prohibition on discriminatory signs and symbols.
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the following reasons: First, the discriminatory signs and symbols model of legislation
was the forerunner of the broader provincial hate speech laws that currently operate in
the provinces of western Canada. Second, at least in some cases, these provisions have
been defined broadly to deal with conduct similar in nature to that at which the broader
hate speech laws are directed. Third, the small number of cases in which these laws
have been subject to judicial or quasi-judicial interpretation shed further light on one
of the main concerns of this article—the practical relationship between the right to free
speech and legislative attempts to protect minorities from harmful expression or
communication.

3.

PROVINCIAL

LAWS

DEALING

WITH

SIGNS

AND

SYMBOLS

INDICATING DISCRIMINATION
3.1 The Prototype: Ontario’s Racial Discrimination Act 194422

The first Canadian statute to restrict racist expression was the Racial Discrimination
Act, passed by the Ontario provincial legislature in 1944. The legislation did not
prohibit discrimination as such. Rather, its specific and sole effect was to prohibit
racially discriminatory publications. Section 1 of the Act stated that:
No person shall,—
(a) publish or display or cause to be published or displayed; or
(b) permit to be published or displayed on lands or premises or in a
newspaper, through a radio broadcasting station or by means of any
other medium which he owns or controls,
any notice, sign, symbol, emblem or other representation indicating
discrimination or an intention to discriminate against any person or any
class of persons for any purpose because of the race or creed of such
person or class of persons.
The model of regulation adopted in the Ontario Racial Discrimination Act has been
described by Tarnopolsky as “quasi-criminal[ization]”.23 Section 3 provided for a
22 R.S.O. 1944, c. 51.
23 See Walter Surma Tarnopolsky, Discrimination and the Law in Canada (Toronto: Richard De Boo
Limited, 1982) at 27 [Tarnopolsky].
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penalty of one hundred dollars for first offences and two hundred dollars for second or
subsequent offences. In addition s.4(2) provided for injunctive relief. The procedure
for enforcement under the Act was a blend of civil and criminal procedures. “Any
person” could commence proceedings in the Supreme Court of Ontario to enforce the
prohibition on discriminatory publication, but the Attorney General’s consent was
required under s.4(1). The 1944 Act was “designed to combat the once prevalent
‘whites only’ signs that were prominently displayed in shop windows, on beaches and
in other places of public resort.”24 This historical context helps to explain what
appears as a rather curious confinement to particular methods of communication, but it
is also important to appreciate that the legislation’s narrow scope is partly explained
by concerns about the encroachment of anti-discrimination legislation on free speech.
Section 2 stated that “[t]his Act shall not be deemed to interfere with the free
expression of opinions upon any subject by speech or in writing .…” 25
The Ontario Racial Discrimination Act became the ‘prototype’ for provincial
legislation across the country.26 A discriminatory signs and symbols provision based
on s.1 of the Act became a standard inclusion in the human rights statutes that were
incrementally adopted by Canadian provinces and territories from the 1940s to the
1970s:
i) Saskatchewan: The Saskatchewan Bill of Rights, R.S.S. 1947, c. 35
s.1427;
ii) New Brunswick: Fair Accommodation Practices Act, R.S.N.B.
1959, c. 6, s.3;28
iii) Nova Scotia: Fair Accommodation Practices Act, S.N.S. 1959, c. 5,
s.5

24 See John D. McAlpine, Report Arising Out of the Activities of the Ku Klux Klan in British

Columbia, presented to the Honourable J. H. Heinrich, Minister of Labour for the Province of British
Columbia (Vancouver: 1981), at 58 [McAlpine].
25 However, it is equally clear that, during a time of war (i.e. World War II) free speech protections
were not universally applicable: s.2 also stated that “This Act...shall not confer any protection to or
benefit upon enemy aliens.” See Tarnopolsky, supra note 23 at 331.
26 Ibid.
27 In 1956 a similar provision was included in s.4 of the Saskatchewan Fair Accommodation Practices
Act, R.S.S. 1956, c. 68.
28 Evidence that some provinces adopted an ‘off the shelf’ approach to human rights law reform, based
on the Ontario Racial Discrimination Act 1944 (supra note 22) may be found in the wording of s.3(2)
of the New Brunswick Fair Accommodation Practices Act 1959, which was enacted more than two
decades after the end of Word War II: “Nothing in this section shall be deemed to interfere with the
free expression of opinions upon any subject by speech or in writing and shall not confer any
protection to or benefit upon enemy aliens” [Emphasis added].
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iv )British Columbia: Fair Accommodation Practices Act, 1961,
R.S.B.C., c. 50, s.4;
v) Yukon Territory: Fair Practices Ordinance, R.O.Y.T. 1971, c..
F2, s.5;
vi) Quebec: Employment Discrimination Act, R.S.Q. 1964, c. 46, s.4;
vii) NWT: Fair Practices Ordinance, R.O.N.W.T 1966, c. 5, s.5;
viii) Prince Edward Island: Human Rights Code, R.S.P.E.I. 1968, c.24,
s.8;
ix) Manitoba: Human Rights Act, R.S.M.1970, c. 104, s.2;
x) Newfoundland: Human Rights Code, R.S.N.L. 1970, c. 262, s.11;
xi) Alberta: Individual’s Rights Protection Act, R.S.A. 1972, c.2, s.2.29
Significantly, the ambiguous free speech qualification contained in the Ontario
model (ss.2) was also widely adopted, and, as will be discussed below, has
subsequently caused considerable consternation with respect to the interpretation and
application of the legislative restrictions on discriminatory signs and symbols as well
as other forms of hate speech.30
As Ontario human rights laws developed and expanded in the 1950s and
1960s, a provision based on s.1 of the Racial Discrimination Act 194431 was included
in the successor statutes, including the Fair Accommodation Practices Act, R.S.O.
1954, c. 2832 and the Ontario Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1961-62, c. 93.
29 In the second reading speech on the Individual’s Rights Protection Bill (Alberta, Legislative

Assembly, Hansard, (17 May 1972) at 52-37), Progressive-Conservative MLA, Ronald Ghitter,
explained the need for the new prohibition on discriminatory signs and symbols by producing examples
of offending signs:
...[L]et me show you the types of signs that we have, right today, in the Province of Alberta.
Here is a sign that is situated on a building in downtown Edmonton. It’s an old sign, but it’s still
there, and on it it says, ‘White Help Only’ Here is another sign that was on a farmer’s yard
along Highway 21 in this province, where the sign states, ‘Indians Stay Out’; here is another
sign which is found in Bowness Park in Calgary, Alberta, and it is a picture of an Indian with a
big mouth, and the sign beside him says, ‘I gettum fat on garbage.’ It is signs like this, Mr.
Speaker, that must be done away with and that is why the importance of the section relating to
the display of emblems and signs which discriminate against a class [sic]. Signs of this nature
are signs we can well do without in the Province of Alberta.
30 See Tarnopolsky, supra note 23 at 331.
31 Supra note 22.
32 The Ontario Fair Accommodation Practices Act R.S.O. 1954, c. 28 also signalled a shift towards
enforcement of legislative prohibitions on race discrimination via complaint to an administrative
officer and, where necessary, adjudication by a quasi-judicial commission or tribunal.
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Today, s.13 of the Ontario Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H-19 provides
that:
13. (1) A right under Part I [of the Code] is infringed by a person
who publishes or displays before the public or causes the
publication or display before the public of any notice, sign, symbol,
emblem, or other similar representation that indicates the intention
of the person to infringe a right under Part I or that is intended by
the person to incite the infringement of a right under Part I.
(2) Subsection (1) shall not interfere with freedom of expression of
opinion.
The main difference between this provision and the 1944 Act is that in its
current form the prohibition applies not only to discrimination on the basis of “race or
creed” but to all categories of unlawful discrimination under Part I of the Code: “race,
ancestry, place of origin, colour, ethnic origin, citizenship, creed, sex, sexual
orientation, age, marital status, same-sex partnership status, family status or
disability”. However, the emphases on discrimination as the consequence which
renders the conduct unlawful, and on “signs and symbols” as the prohibited mode of
communication, remain. In one important respect the current formulation of the
discriminatory signs and symbols prohibition in the Ontario Human Rights Code 1990
is even narrower than the original. The display of a sign or symbol will only be
unlawful under s.13 if the person responsible intends to unlawfully discriminate or
intends to incite others to discriminate. It is no longer sufficient in Ontario that the
sign or symbol indicates discrimination—a formulation of the relationship between
conduct and consequence which, although ambiguous, can be interpreted to support a
focus on the effect of the display of the sign, irrespective of the intention of the person
responsible for the display. Consequently, the current legislation in those provincial
and territorial jurisdictions that have adopted and maintained the original ‘Ontario
model’ now casts a slightly broader net with respect to the regulation of discriminatory
signs and symbols than the legislation currently in force in Ontario.
Notwithstanding its pioneering origins and symbolic significance, it is not
surprising, given the maintenance of these restrictive features, that there have been no
board of inquiry, tribunal or court decisions in Ontario involving an allegation of a
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violation of the prohibition on discriminatory signs and symbols in s.13 of the Code.33
Section 13 has been described as “only useful in addressing a narrow range of
circumstances that might fall within the general category of hate motivated activities”
with the result that the Ontario Human Rights Code “...has a very limited capacity for
dealing with hate propaganda.”34
The same may be said of the provisions found in the legislation of those
provincial and territorial jurisdictions that have followed the original Ontario model,
even though they are now somewhat broader in terms than current Ontario legislation.
However, in a small number of cases the discriminatory signs and symbols prohibition
has been invoked and subjected to adjudication.
3.2 Applying the Discriminatory Signs and Symbols Model

In the three decades or so during which legislative prohibitions on discriminatory signs
and symbols have been in operation in the majority of Canadian provinces and
territories, there have been only seven public adjudications—that is, decisions handed
down by a board of inquiry, tribunal or court in response to a complaint that the
legislation had been violated. In five of these cases, the complaint was upheld,
suggesting that the definition of unlawful conduct under the Ontario model is not so
33 Section 13 of the Ontario Human Rights Code 1990 has been addressed in one Board of Inquiry

decision, but it was not a hate speech complaint. In Entrop v. Imperial Oil Ltd (No 8) (1996), 27
C.H.R.R. D/210, an Ontario Board of Inquiry held that print/video communications of a discriminatory
workplace drug testing policy were breaches of s.13: Email from Brian Eyolfson, Counsel, Ontario
Human Rights Commission (2 September 1999). See also Entrop v. Imperial Oil Ltd. (2000), 50 O.R.
(3d) 18, 189 D.L.R. (4th) 14 (Ontario C.A.).
In Lam v. McCaw (1977), Ontario (Ontario Bd. Inq.), the complaint involved precisely the sort of
conduct at which the discriminatory signs and symbols prohibition was directed: the display by a
landlord of a sign on rental premises in Kingston, Ontario, that said “Aryan Caucasian Adults Only”.
Ironically, however, the Board of Inquiry did not consider whether there had been a breach of the
prohibition on discriminatory signs and symbols in s.1 of the Ontario Human Rights Code, R.S.O.
1970, c. 318. At the request of the complainants and the Ontario Human Rights Commission, the Board
focused instead on whether there had been accommodation discrimination contrary to s.3 of the Code
(The Board ruled that there had, and ordered the respondent to pay the complainants $500 damages.).
According to the Board, the “reasons for avoiding” the discriminatory signs and symbols prohibition,
cited by counsel for the complainants and the Commission, “were that questions of its constitutional
validity might come up, in relation to rights of freedom of expression (at 5). As will be revealed
throughout this article, variations of this theme have been a recurring feature of the operation of
provincial hate speech laws from the 1970s to the present day.
34 Letter from Calvin Bernard, Acting Director, Ontario Human Rights Commission to author (18
February 1994). An important practical consequence of the Code’s limited anti-hate laws is that
complaints concerning hate propaganda are “typically referred by [Ontario Human Rights
Commission] staff to the Ministry of Attorney General” for handling under the Canadian Criminal
Code’s hate speech provisions (ibid.).
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narrow as to be completely without effect. However, an examination of the decided
cases—including the nature of the conduct which gave rise to the initiation of a
complaint, and the analysis and reasoning employed during the course of adjudication
—does confirm that legislation prohibiting discriminatory signs and symbols has
played only a very minor role in the regulation of conduct which generates ill-feeling
towards identifiable groups. The main reason for this has been that this approach only
regulates a very small sub-set of the modes of communication which can be employed
to generate ill-feeling or promote discrimination, but some uncertainty regarding the
meaning of the phrase “indicates discrimination” has also been a factor.
Nonetheless, an examination of these decisions introduces and illustrates some
important themes in the history of the construction of the hate speech/free speech
boundary under Canadian provincial laws. In addition, it provides an important
background and context for the operation and interpretation of the broader provincial
hate speech laws which currently operate in the western Canadian provinces, and
which will be considered in Part 4 of the article.
Levesque and Tardif v. The Daily Gleaner and Smith35

The first formal adjudication in relation to a complaint of unlawful display of a
discriminatory sign or symbol in Canada arose under s.6 of New Brunswick Human
Rights Act36 in 1974. It was a rather inauspicious debut for public pronouncements on
the legal regulation of racist hate speech in Canada: Ferdinand Levesque and Patrick
Tardif complained that two letters to the editor that appeared in a Fredericton
newspaper, The Daily Gleaner, and which were written by Donald Smith, violated s.6
in that their contents promoted hatred and racism against the Francophone
community.37
The Board of Inquiry ruled that the conduct complained of did not fall within
the scope of the Act. Based on an idiosyncratic interpretation of the words “person or
class of persons” in s.6, the Board concluded that the Act “does not provide the

35 (10 September 1974) New Brunswick (N.B. Bd. Inq.) [The Daily Gleaner].
36 R.S.N.B. 1985, c. 30.
37 The content and tone of the letters is illustrated by the opening of the 12 February 1974 letter: “Sir:
As we all know to our sorrow, the Liberal “Equal Opportunity” caper was nothing but a thinly
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machinery to deal with a complaint by one or two people on behalf of a large group of
people with the same ethnic background.”38 The Board interpreted the legislation as
requiring the complainants to establish that they had been personally discriminated
against by the respondents, even though this requirement seems to have no foundation
in the words of s.6 and is at odds with what was widely regarded as the objective of
legislative restrictions on the public display of discriminatory signs and symbols. In
any event, the written decision makes it clear that the Board of Inquiry was not
sympathetic to the imposition of legal restrictions on public communication,
particularly by a human rights commission.
Thirty years on, the decision in The Daily Gleaner is unsatisfactory—
particularly because it failed to consider the complaint on its merits,39 and instead
dismissed the complaint on dubious jurisdictional grounds. However, the decision
remains a significant part of the history of provincial hate speech laws in Canada, not
simply because it was the first discriminatory signs and symbols case to be
adjudicated, but because it contains a number of linked features which have become
recurring themes in subsequently decided cases in other jurisdictions. Specifically, the
Board of Inquiry’s approach was underpinned by an understanding of free speech
which left little room for the legal regulation of (what we now refer to as) hate speech,
including:
i) a relatively broad conception of the category of ‘free speech’—that
is, communication which should, as a matter of principle, be immune
from legislative curtailment;
ii) the view that only the federal Parliament, and not a provincial
legislature, was constitutionally entitled to enact laws which restricted
freedom of speech (including press freedom); and
iii) the ‘subsection two free speech rider’, which was a standard
inclusion in provincial discriminatory signs and symbols/hate speech
laws, was regarded as a major constraint on the scope of the legislative
restriction.
disguised manoeuvre to make the non-French the economic keepers of the French” (The Daily
Gleaner, supra note 35, at 13).
38 Ibid. at 3.
39 Note that even if the Board of Inquiry had considered the complaint on its merits rather than
rejecting it on spurious grounds, it is likely that the complaint would still have failed at the first hurdle:
a newspaper ‘letter to the editor’ is unlikely to have been regarded as “any notice, sign, symbol,
emblem or other representation” (s.6). See Warren and Chapman [Winnipeg Sun 3], infra note 186;
Human Rights Commission v. University of Saskatchewan Engineering Students’ Society [Red Eye 2],
infra note 210 (both discussed below, Part 4.2).
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While these themes have recurred with some regularity over the years, they
have certainly not been approached or resolved in a consistent fashion. As the
following discussion of another of the early adjudications reveals, some decisionmakers have unequivocally embraced the legitimacy of legislative prohibitions on
discriminatory signs and symbols. Consequently, these decision-makers have been
willing to adopt a broad interpretation of the scope of the legislation, and to interpret
ambiguous phrases (such as ‘indicates discrimination’) in a manner which has the
potential to include within the net of Ontario model legislation conduct that
contributes to the broader social context of negative attitudes towards particular
groups, thereby indirectly creating an increased risk of discriminatory behaviour.
However, even where this approach has been taken, the scope of provincial legislation
based on the Ontario model has been unavoidably restricted by the fact that it applies
only to particular modes of communication (that is, signs and symbols etc.).

Sambo’s Pepperpot (Singer v. Iwasyk and Pennywise Foods Ltd.)40

Two years after the New Brunswick Board of Inquiry handed down its decision in The
Daily Gleaner, the Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission was called upon to
adjudicate on a complaint lodged under the prohibition on discriminatory signs and
symbols in s.4 of the Fair Accommodation Practices Act 1965.41 The complainant,
Barry Singer, alleged that the respondents, who operated a restaurant in Creighton,
Saskatchewan called “Sambo’s Pepperpot”, had breached s.4 by displaying a sign on
the restaurant which showed “a caricature of a small person with black or brown skin
colour wearing a Chef’s hat and a grass skirt and bearing the words ‘Sambo’s
Pepperpot’”.42 The caricature also appeared on advertising (including bumper stickers
and matchbooks) along with the words, “Jez Aint None Better”.43 The Commission
agreed with the complainant that the signs were unlawful because they “indicated
discrimination”:

40 Singer v. Iwasyk and Pennywise Foods Ltd. (5 November 1976), Saskatchewan (Saskatchewan Bd.
Inq.) [Sambo’s Pepperpot].
41 R.S.S. 1965, c. 379.
42 Supra note 40 at 1.
43 Ibid.
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The Commission feels it is proper to ask the following question:
“Would the representation of blacks as childish, funny, emasculated,
inferior, as described by the witnesses, indicate discrimination?”
To put it another way, it is not only a question of whether a black
person would feel humiliated or be insulted by this representation, but
the question of whether or not such a person’s rights to equal treatment
in housing and public accommodation would be affected.
It seems to us that to ask the question is to answer it. If a stereotypical
image of a certain class of persons as incompetent, childish and funny
is allowed to be displayed, the opportunities of members of the class
for responsible jobs and to obtain rights on an equal footing with the
majority class grouping are endangered.
The effect of such a caricature is to reinforce prejudice against blacks
and as a consequence to prolong the existence of hangovers of
prejudice against non-white minority groups in Canada. It also
promotes a negative image about blacks.44
In defending its ascription of a broad definition to the phrase “indicating
discrimination” the Commission observed that the phrase must have been intended by
the legislature to cover harmful effects in addition to those covered by the phrase
“indicating an intention to discriminate”. It cited as examples of the latter, signs which
stated that “Blacks Will Not Be Served Here” or “Whites Only”, and continued:
On the other hand, a poster, drawing, cartoon or other similar
representation, in words or otherwise, depicting blacks as inferior to
white persons, would disclose a discriminatory predilection, belief or
attitude, and thereby indicate discrimination against blacks but would
not necessarily indicate an intention to discriminate.45
There is an implicit acknowledgement in the Commission’s reasons that the
meaning of the phrase “indicating discrimination” is not self-evident and that it may
not have been the best choice for capturing the nature of the harmful effects of racist
signs and symbols at which the legislation restriction is directed. However, the
Commission recognised that it was being called on to interpret a provision, which,
although operative in most provinces, had not previously been subjected to judicial or
quasi-judicial interpretation,46 and took the position that it was obligated
…to adopt a liberal interpretation of the law in order to fulfill the
legislative objective as set forth in Section 7(a) of The Saskatchewan
44 Ibid. at 4.
45 Ibid. at 6.
46 There was no mention of the decision handed down two years earlier in The Daily Gleaner, supra

note 35.
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Human Rights Commission Act [R.S.S. 1972, c. 108], namely to: ‘(a)
forward the principle that every person is free and equal in dignity and
rights without regard to race, creed, colour, religion, sex, nationality,
ancestry or place of origin.’47
William Iwasyk and Pennywise Foods Ltd. were ordered to remove the “Sambo”
caricature and the name “Sambo’s” from the restaurant sign, and to refrain from using
the caricature and name in operating the restaurant in Creighton or elsewhere in
Saskatchewan.48
The nature of the conduct in question in Sambo’s Pepperpot was such as to fit
squarely with the ‘signs and symbols’ category, and so the implications of the
legislation’s narrow focus on such modes of communication was left for another day.
However, another apparent constraint within the legislation—the focus on
discriminatory consequences—was in fact, interpreted broadly, promising to offer a
relatively broad level of protection, at least in terms of the harmful effects of the
conduct in question.49 However, any assumption that Sambo’s Pepperpot settled all
outstanding questions regarding the scope and validity of provincial discriminatory
signs and symbols laws was shown to be ill-founded by events in British Columbia a
few years later. In particular, Hunky Bill (discussed below) revealed that reservations
about the propriety of legal restrictions on even narrowly defined modes of ‘speech’ or
communication of the type voiced in the Daily Gleaner, were not limited to New
Brunswick; they were manifested in British Columbia in a narrow reading of the
“indicates discrimination” component of the definition.
The KKK in British Columbia, the McAlpine Report and Hunky Bill50

47 Supra note 40 at 7.
48 Ibid., order at 1,2. The respondents appealed unsuccessfully against the Commission’s decision on
various procedural grounds: see Re Iwasyk and Human Rights Commission of Saskatchewan, [1977], 6
W.W.R. 699, (1977) 80 D.L.R. (3d) 1 (Sask QB); Iwasyk and Pennywise Foods Ltd. v. The
Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission, [1978] 5 W.W.R. 499, (1978) 87 D.L.R. (3d) 289 (Sask
CA).
49 More than 20 years later in Red Eye 2 (Infra note 208, discussed below, Part 4.2) Cameron J.A. in
the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal commented on the Board of Inquiry decision in Sambo’s Pepperpot
at 620: “Without suggesting the board erred in doing so, it certainly gave s.4 of the Fair
Accommodation Practices Act a generous interpretation”.
50 See infra note 60.
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The inherent limitations of the standard ‘Ontario model’ prohibition on discriminatory
signs and symbols as a legal mechanism for regulating hate were illustrated by a series
of events in British Columbia in the early 1980s.
In 1980 the Ku Klux Klan began to work actively in Vancouver. In October
1980 Alexander McQuirter, one of the KKK’s chief organisers in Canada appeared on
a Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) program and made a number of racially
vilifying comments. For example, he observed that one of the Klan’s ‘beliefs’ was that
“God created different races and put them in different parts of the world, and we feel
it’s evil and unchristian to race mix them...”.51 McQuirter explained that the Klan
advocated a program whereby “all the money we’ve spent on the multi-racial crap
already” could be used to “voluntarily repatriate…non-whites” to the “land of their
origin”.52 He claimed to be “standing up for white people because whites are now
facing reverse discrimination in this country ...”.53
McQuirter’s comments prompted calls for legal redress. One complainant
sought the British Columbia Attorney General’s consent for a prosecution under the
Criminal Code’s hate propaganda provisions. Other complainants alleged that
McQuirter and the KKK had contravened various sections of the British Columbia
Human Rights Code 1979, including the s.2 prohibition on discriminatory signs and
symbols, which at the time, provided that:
(1) No person shall publish or display before the public, or cause to
be published or displayed before the public, a notice, sign, symbol,
emblem or other representation indicating discrimination or an
intention to discriminate against a person or class of persons in any
manner prohibited by this Act.
In March 1981 the Minister of Labour (J.H. Heinrich) appointed John McAlpine to
“determine whether there was sufficient evidence against the Ku Klux Klan of its
contravention of the Human Rights Code…to warrant the appointment of a board of
inquiry.”54 McAlpine concluded that “the Ku Klux Klan has not contravened the
Human Rights Code, the reason being that the current provisions of the Code are
framed too narrowly.”55

51 McAlpine, supra note 24 at 4.
52 Ibid. at 4.
53 Ibid. at 5.
54 Ibid. at 1.
55 Ibid.
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McAlpine observed that s.2 “is the only section that affords any possible basis
for proceeding against the Klan”.56 However, for a number of reasons he concluded
that the conduct of McQuirter and the Klan could not be considered a contravention of
the section. First, it was limited to particular modes of representation. In McAlpine’s
view these did not include literature or statements made on television or radio.57
Second, subsection 2 (that is, a version of the standard free speech rider) necessitated a
narrow reading of subsection 1.58 Third, and most important, the words “in any
manner prohibited by this Act”, “were intended to limit the scope of section 2 by tying
that section directly to the proscribed areas of discrimination.”59
McAlpine’s assessment of the limitations of s.2 was prescient (or influential!).
The operation and scope of s.2 of the Human Rights Code 1979 was considered for the
first time by a Board of Inquiry in 1982 in the case of Ukrainian Canadian
Professional and Business Association of Vancouver v. William Konyk and Winnipeg
Garlic Sausage Co. Ltd.60 The case arose out of a complaint lodged by the Ukrainian
Canadian Professional and Business Association of Vancouver with the British
Columbia Human Rights Council which alleged that Konyk had breached s.2(1) by
displaying the name “Hunky Bill” on business signs, advertisements, publications,
commercial items and vehicles promoting his restaurants and food concessions.
Before the Board of Inquiry Konyk explained that he had been nicknamed
“Hunky Bill” in high school, and that he had continued to use the name ever since.
“Hunky Bill” was the registered trade name under which he operated his food-related
business. The complainant claimed that, even in these circumstances, the public
display of a derogatory ethnic name like “hunky” constituted discrimination against
members of the Ukrainian Canadian Professional and Business Association of
Vancouver, and persons of Ukrainian descent in British Columbia.
The Board accepted that the term was regarded by many as a pejorative and
offensive term used to refer to immigrants from east-central Europe and found that
“the term ‘hunky’ stands in the same class of collective nouns such as ‘chink’, ‘wop’,

56 Ibid. at 58.
57 Ibid.
58 McAlpine may have over-stated the effect of the sub-section two rider: see Kane v. Church of Jesus

Christ Christian-Aryan Nations [Kane], infra note 91.
59 McAlpine, supra note 24 at 58.
60 (1982), 3 C.H.R.R. D/1157 (B.C. Bd. Inq.) [Hunky Bill]
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‘mick’, ‘paddy’, ‘goolle’ etc.”61 However, the Board of Inquiry ruled that the
respondent’s display of the name “Hunky Bill” did not constitute a violation of s.2 of
the B.C. Human Rights Code. The Board emphasised that s.2 did not render unlawful
conduct which was offensive; it “…only prohibits signs that indicate discrimination or
intent to discriminate in the manner prohibited by the Human Rights Code itself.”62
Accordingly, s.2 did not create an offence in itself and had to be read in light of other
provisions of the Code, and, most relevantly, s.3:
(1) No person shall …

(b) Discriminate against a person or class of persons with respect to
any…service or facility customarily available to the public, unless
reasonable cause exists for the denial or discrimination….
The Board distinguished the Saskatchewan Board of Inquiry decision in Sambo’s
Pepperpot, primarily on the basis that the equivalent legislation in Saskatchewan was
broader in terms, covering any form of discrimination.
The Board of Inquiry found no evidence of discrimination as defined in s.3,
concluding that “[t]he evidence is that while the vast majority of Canadian/Ukrainian
background might find the name offensive, nevertheless they are free to use the
restaurant and indeed, many do.”63 In response to the complainant’s submission that
many people of Ukrainian descent refrain from using “Hunky Bill” restaurants because
they refuse to “patronize a restaurant [in] which they felt belittled and discriminated
against…”,64 the Board of Inquiry concluded that such “subjective discrimination”
was distinct from the “discrimination in an objective legal sense” which is prohibited
under the Code.65
The Board of Inquiry dismissed the complaint, concluding that it did “not fall
within the category of the mischief, which the legislature in passing the Human Rights
Code, was endeavouring to suppress.”66 An appeal to the British Columbia Supreme
Court was unsuccessful. Macdonell J. held that the Board of Inquiry had correctly
interpreted and applied s.2. Specifically Macdonell J. upheld the Board of Inquiry
61 Ibid. at D/1159.
62 Ibid. at D/1161.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid. at D/1162.
65 Ibid.
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finding that “s.2 of the Human Rights Code does not create a substantive offence
standing by itself.”67
It is a moot point as to whether the outcome in Hunky Bill can be defended on
the basis of the wording of s.2 of the Human Rights Code. Certainly, the approach
adopted by the Board of Inquiry, and endorsed by the Supreme Court, seemed to
leave very little room for the operation of s.2 in relation to conduct which the general
s.3 prohibition on discrimination did not already cover.
Whatever its specific merits, or broader significance in the history of Canadian
hate speech laws, the immediate effect of Hunky Bill was that it confirmed
McAlpine’s assessment that the Human Rights Code prohibition on discriminatory
signs and symbols was not a form of legal redress from which victims of hate speech
in British Columbia could expect much assistance.68
Perhaps the most interesting aspects of the decision are those passages where
the Board indicated that its preference for a very narrow interpretation of s.2 of the
Code was motivated by broader reservations regarding the use of legislative
prohibitions as a mechanism for dealing with racist speech, and about the role of law
in advancing human rights more generally (reminiscent of the views expressed by the
New Brunswick Board of Inquiry in The Daily Gleaner). In Hunky Bill, the Board
observed:
There is no doubt…that the use of the term “hunky” or any other that
offends deeply held feelings, is to be discouraged.
That is not to say that such terms either are or should be prohibited by
law. To attempt to do so would be to choke freedom in the name of
liberty....
Perhaps people should learn to laugh at themselves more and take
themselves less seriously. Perhaps that way, there would be less
discrimination.

66 Ibid.
67 Ukrainian Canadian Professional and Business Association of Vancouver v. Konyk and Winnipeg

Garlic Sausage Co Ltd., [1983] 6 W.W.R. 204 at 206, (1983) 149 D.L.R. (3d) 763 (BCSC) [cited to
W.W.R.]. Macdonell J. also rejected the argument advanced by the appellant that the word
“discrimination” should be interpreted broadly to include “signs that may offend the dignity and pride
of persons of Ukrainian descent without any act of discrimination or prejudiced treatment of the group”
at 207.
68 Section 2 of the Code remained unaltered in the Human Rights Act 1984, which superseded the 1979
Human Rights Code, and was retained until 1993, when the British Columbia legislature replaced it
with a broader prohibition on hate speech (see below, part 3.2).
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When Dr. Kehoe [an expert witness called by the complainant]
advocated changing the law to change behaviour, he implied that
changes can be meaningfully made by compulsion. I wonder if he is
right. Human rights, like the work ethic, are surely not matters of law,
not of compulsion, but of culture. A tolerant society can only be
brought about through education, rather than compulsion.69
Although these comments on the limits of law when it comes to the protection
of human rights are more explicit than is usual in a quasi-judicial adjudication context,
it would be naïve to think that this was the only occasion on which an adjudicator has
brought to bear on a decision in an individual case his or her personal philosophy of
the relationship between law, rights, and freedom. Indeed, in the context of
adjudication on provincial hate speech laws, such influence is a recurring feature of
many decisions. As a result, because of the diverse range of views on the preferred
breadth of rights such as the right to free speech, there has been a degree of
inconsistency across the provinces in the approach adopted to the interpretation and
application of civil restrictions on hate speech, and in the case-by-case negotiation of
the line between unlawful hate speech and protected expression.
This point is well made by contrasting the decision in Hunky Bill with two
cases from Nova Scotia, in which the decision-makers exhibited considerably greater
sympathy for the spirit and goals of human rights legislation, leading them to make the
most of the limited discriminatory signs and symbol prohibition as a mechanism for
extending protection to victims of racism and negative stereotypes.

The Nova Scotia Cases: Rasheed and the Black United Front of Nova Scotia v.
Bramhill70 and The Association of Black Social Workers and Thomas-Bernard v. Arts
Plus and Daoud71

Two public inquiry decisions have been handed down under the discriminatory signs
and symbols provision currently found in s.7 of the Nova Scotia Human Rights Act
1989. Decided on either side of British Columbia’s Hunky Bill (in 1980 and 1994,
respectively), what is most significant about these decisions is that both resulted in the
complaint being upheld. In both cases, this outcome resulted from a relatively broad
interpretation of the scope of the legislative restriction on discriminatory signs and
69 Supra note 60, at D/1161.
70 (1981), 2 C.H.R.R. D/249 at D/250l (N.S. Bd. Inq.) [Bramhill]
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symbols in Nova Scotia’s human rights legislation. These decisions underscore the
fact that in those jurisdictions where there is no legislative provision dealing generally
with the promotion of hatred or contempt, adjudicators may feel considerable pressure
to adapt the tools at their disposal (that is, ostensibly narrow restrictions on
discriminatory signs and symbols) where the conduct that is the subject of the
complaint is regarded as contrary to the spirit of human rights legislation. The
ambiguity of the phrase “indicates discrimination” lends itself to such adaptation.
However, it is questionable whether it should be necessary for adjudicators to expose
themselves to potential criticism for overly broad interpretations of the relevant
legislative provisions in order to avoid failing to provide a remedy to a deserving
complainant.

Bramhill

In July 1980 a complaint was lodged with the Nova Scotia Human Rights Commission
by Hamid Rasheed on behalf of The Black United Front of Nova Scotia alleging that
the respondent, Barry Bramhill had contravened the prohibition on discriminatory
signs and symbols which, at the time, was contained in s.12 of the Nova Scotia Human
Rights Act 196972:
(1) No person shall publish, display or broadcast, or permit to be
published, displayed or broadcast on lands or premises, or in a
newspaper or through a radio or television broadcasting station or
by means of any other medium, any notice, sign, symbol,
implement or other representation indicating discrimination or an
intention to discriminate against a person, or class or person for any
purpose.
Bramhill had published and distributed buttons which carried a photo of a Black
person accompanied by the words “I’m a Big Mouth Cape Bretoner - So Kiss Me”.
The Board of Inquiry held that the publication and display of the button and
card did violate the legislation prohibition on discriminatory signs and symbols. The
Chairman rejected the respondent’s submission that the representation did not indicate
discrimination:

71 (29 March 1994), Nova Scotia (N.S. Bd. Inq.) [Arts Plus].
72 R.S.N.S. 1969, c. 11.
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The Respondent argues that offensiveness or bad taste is not sufficient
and that the button in the case before us, does not draw unwarranted or
invidious distinctions between Blacks or anyone else. I cannot agree.
Using the definition cited by the Respondent, an invidious distinction
means one that is ‘likely to draw discontent or animosity, of an
unpleasant or objectionable nature, hateful, obnoxious, causing harm or
resentment’ (Webster’s Third New International Dictionary). The
button, in combination with the card, conveys the idea that Black
persons in general or female Black persons in particular, are loud and
stupid. The button thus emphasized a distinguishing characteristic of a
negative type. Taken in the historical context of the Black as a racial
minority, it goes beyond bade taste and mere offensiveness. Such a
statement might, for example, very well tend to activate latent prejudice
and indirectly affect employment opportunities for Blacks.73
In support of this interpretation of the scope of the s.12 prohibition on
discriminatory signs and symbols, the Nova Scotia Board of Inquiry cited with
approval the 1976 decision of the Saskatchewan Board of Inquiry in Sambo’s Pepper
Pot. Consistent with this decision, and in stark contrast to the approach adopted by the
British Columbia Board of Inquiry in Hunky Bill, in Bramhill the Board of Inquiry
expressly adopted a liberal interpretation of the breadth of the prohibition in s.12, on
the basis that Nova Scotia’s human rights legislation was “designed to secure the
rights of citizens to non-discriminatory conduct”.74
Bramhill was ordered to make a written apology including an assurance that he
would comply with the Human Rights Act in the future. He was also ordered to hand
all remaining buttons over to the Nova Scotia Human Rights Commission for
destruction.75 The Board of Inquiry ruled that the complainant’s request for damages
should be denied “[b]ecause the evidence clearly shows that Mr. Bramhill did not have
an intention to discriminate against Black persons by distributing the button ...”.76
Another significant feature of the decision in Bramhill is that the Board of
Inquiry was required to consider the validity of the legislation, in response to the
respondent’s argument that “[s]ection 12(1) is beyond the legislative competence of
the Provincial Legislature to the extent that it affects freedom of speech.”77 The Nova
Scotia Board of Inquiry rejected this argument on two bases:

73 Supra note 70 at D/250.
74 Ibid. at D/251.
75 Ibid. at D/252.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid. at D/251.
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First, citing the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Attorney-General
for Canada v. Dupont78 the Board noted that “[f]reedom of speech is neither a Federal
nor a Provincial matter exclusively; whether a law is ultra vires [or] not, must be
determined by its pith and substance.”79 The Nova Scotia Human Rights Act, including
s.12, was valid because it was essentially concerned with “Property and Civil Rights”,
which is within the constitutional authority of the provinces under s.92(13) of the
Constitution Act 1867.80
Second, the Board of Inquiry in Bramhill emphasised that freedom of speech is
not absolute:
In particular cases, the right of free speech may have to give way to
other human rights, such as the right not to be discriminated against,
so that although the law infringes the right to freedom of speech, it
does not inviolate it and it is, therefore, not unconstitutional.81
The Board noted that the free speech ‘rider’ in s.12(2) needed to be understood in this
context, and not interpreted as “imposing an absolute limit” on s.12(1).
In its disposal of the respondent’s free speech objections, and its adoption of a
broad interpretation of the prohibition on discriminatory signs and symbols, the
decision of the Nova Scotia Board of Inquiry in Bramhill occupies an important
position in the history of Canadian provincial laws restricting various forms of hate
speech—a position which may be regarded as at the opposite end of the spectrum to
the decision in Hunky Bill.

Arts Plus

In October 1992 the Association of Black Social Workers and Wanda ThomasBernard lodged a complaint with the Nova Scotia Human Rights Commission which
alleged that the graphic displayed on sweatshirts sold by Mike Daoud in his “Arts
Plus” store violated the prohibition on discriminatory signs and symbols in s.7 of the
Nova Scotia Human Rights Act 1989.
The content of the graphic is most easily conveyed by reciting the description
offered in the decision of the Board of Inquiry:
78 (1978), 2 S.C.R. 770.
79 Supra note 70 at D/250, D/252.
80 (U.K.), 30 &31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C., 1885, App. II, No. 5.
81 Bramhill, supra note 70 at D/252.
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The ... [sweatshirt] is white in colour, and is plain with the exception of
an approximately 10” by 9” rectangular area on he front portion of
sweatshirt where a scene is depicted. The scene is of a bedroom
containing a steel-framed bed, a pinkish/reddish light bulb hanging
from a lighting fixture from the ceiling, cracked walls, and a mouse
lying on the floor, laughing. The predominant feature of the scene is a
rear view of a black woman with a large buttocks wearing nothing but
high heeled shoes and stockings, carrying a bottle and heading toward
the bed. Between the two sides of the woman’s buttocks is a white male
who appears trapped in the buttocks. The black woman appears to be
looking for the white male, and the words depicted below the scene are
‘Harold... Harold..? I’m ready for you...’.82
After investigation (during which time Daoud removed the sweatshirts from display
having previously refused to do so upon request from Bernard and others), the Nova
Scotia Human Rights Commission appointed a Board of Inquiry on 7 July 1993.
During the inquiry, Dr. Sherene Razack, an expert in race and gender issues,
was called by the Nova Scotia Human Rights Commission. Dr. Razack testified that
“the sweatshirt was part of an accumulation of discrimination...that a black woman is
seen by society as a prostitute, as animal like, and as degraded or inferior” and that the
sweatshirt “caused great harm as it was a very powerful reminder of the thoughts it
was portraying.”83 The respondent, Daoud, countered that he had not specifically
ordered the Harold sweatshirts—they had arrived as part of an order of a variety of
sweatshirts filled by a supplier in Ontario. He gave evidence that some of the
sweatshirts had even been sold to black customers.
The Board concluded without discussion that the image fell within the
statutory definition of a representation, and that the sweatshirt when displayed in the
Arts Plus Store was a ‘medium’ for the purposes of s.7. For the Board of Inquiry the
only legal issue was whether the graphic indicated discrimination or an intention to
discriminate on one of the prohibited grounds.
Section 4 of the Nova Scotia Human Rights Act 198984 defines discrimination
in the following way:
For the purpose of this Act, a person discriminates where the person
makes a distinction, whether intentional or not, based on a
characteristic, or perceived characteristic, referred to in clauses (h) to
(v) of subsection (1) of Section 5 that has the effect of imposing
burdens, obligations, or disadvantages on an individual or a class of
82 Arts Plus, supra note 71 at 3.
83 Ibid. at 6.
84 R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 214.
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individuals not imposed upon others or which withholds or limits
access to opportunities, benefits and advantages available to other
individuals or classes of individuals in society.
In addressing this issue the Board of Inquiry considered the earlier Nova Scotia Board
of Inquiry decision in Bramhill,85 as well as the decision of the Saskatchewan Board
of Inquiry in Sambo’s Pepperpot.86 Following the approach adopted by the Nova
Scotia Board of Inquiry in Bramhill, the Board held in Arts Plus that the representation
on the sweatshirt was discriminatory:
...[I]t is my conclusion that the Harold Sweatshirt, by depicting Black
women as overly sexual and impoverished, makes a distinction based
on race and/or colour and or sex which conceivably influences
opportunities, benefits and advantages available to this group.87
The Board noted that the evidence indicated that the respondent had not
intended to discriminate, but reiterated the view expressed in Bramhill that the
prohibition on racially discriminatory representations could be contravened even in the
absence of intention. That is, the prohibition applies to (i) representations that
(objectively) indicate discrimination; and (ii) representations which (subjectively)
indicate an intention to discriminate. However, while the absence of intention on the
part of the respondent in this case was irrelevant to the question whether he had
contravened the first tire of the s.7 prohibition, the Board of Inquiry considered that
his lack of intention made an award of damages inappropriate. The Board of Inquiry
ordered that the respondent apologise in writing to the complainants, and “[c]ease
displaying and/or offering for sale the Harold Sweatshirts, and any other material
which is discriminatory.”88
There is a very clear difference between the approach of the British Columbia
Board of Inquiry in Hunky Bill, and that of the Nova Scotia Boards of Inquiry in
Bramhill and Arts Plus; a difference which cannot be fully explained by factual
differences or variations between the respective provincial statutes. Rather, the
contrast reveals two competing sets of values regarding the desirability and
appropriateness of legislative restrictions on hate speech, and highlights the impact
that the personal views of adjudicators can have on the outcome of individual
85 Supra note 70.
86 Supra note 40.
87 Supra, note 71 at 10.
88 Ibid. at 11.
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complaints. This is particularly evident in an environment where there is ongoing
debate about the merits of legislative restrictions on hate speech, the statutory
language employed is relatively vague and flexible, and there is limited jurisprudence
or judicial guidance on the interpretation of the legislative prohibition in question.
In this context, it is important to consider how the Supreme Court of Canada’s
early 1990s articulation of the parameters of the right to freedom of expression, and
confirmation of the constitutional validity of legislative restrictions on hate speech has
impacted on the way in which provincial adjudicators approach the task of
determining the merits of alleged breaches of legislative restrictions on various forms
of hate speech, and constructing the boundaries of unlawful hate speech. Surprisingly,
there was no consideration of the leading 1990 Supreme Court of Canada decisions89
in the 1994 Arts Plus decision, but they figured prominently in the first of two Board
of Inquiry decisions handed down in relation to the prohibition on discriminatory
signs and symbols which operated in Alberta from 1972 until 1996.90

Alberta

Kane v. Church of Jesus Christ Christian-Aryan Nations91

In December 1990 Harvey Kane lodged a complaint with the Alberta Human Rights
Commission. Six other people subsequently lodged complaints in relation to the same
conduct. The complainants alleged that the respondents, Terry Long (the Canadian
leader of a white supremacist organisation called the Church of Jesus Christ ChristianAryan Nations) and Ray Bradley, had contravened s.2(1) of the (then) Alberta
Individual’s Rights Protection Act.92 At the time, the relevant portions of s.2 provided
that:
(1) No person shall publish or display before the public or cause to
be published or displayed before the public any notice, sign,
symbol, emblem or other representation indicating discrimination or
an intention to discriminate against any person because of the race,

89 Keegstra, supra note 3; Taylor, supra note 4.
90 In 1996, a broader hate speech prohibition was added to the re-named Human Rights, Citizenship

and Multiculturalism Act, R.S.A. 1996, c. 25 (see below, part 4.2).
91 (1992), 18 C.H.R.R. D/268 (Alberta Bd. Inq.) [Kane].
92 R.S.A. 1972, c. 2. [IRPA].
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religious beliefs, colour, physical disability, age ancestry or place of
origin of that person or class of persons.

(2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to interfere with the free
expression of opinion on any subject.
The conduct in question took place at an outdoor ‘Aryan Fest’ meeting organised
by the Church of Jesus Christ Christian-Aryan Nations at a farm (owned by Ray
Bradley) near the town of Provost, Alberta on 8-9 September 1990. It consisted of the
display of a Swastika flag and a sign that said “KKK White Power”, the wearing of
Nazi uniforms and swastika armbands, the burning of a thirty feet tall cross, the giving
of the “Nazi salute”, shouts of “Death to the Jew”, “White Power” and “Sieg Heil”, the
wearing (by Terry Long) of a hat with a Confederate flag emblem accompanied by the
words “White Pride”, and the wearing of white T-shirts as “shrouds”. Two of the
complainants (including Kane) were present in Provost on the day. The other
complainants saw newspaper and television coverage of the event.
On 12 June 1991 a Board of Inquiry was appointed to inquire into the
complaints of a contravention of s.2(1). The Board held that the respondents had
contravened the prohibition on the display of discriminatory signs and symbols.93
The Board had no difficulty in concluding that the Swastika, the burning cross
and the “White Power” sign were displayed by the respondents and that these modes
of representation fell within the definition of “symbols” (and “signs” in the latter
case). The Board rejected the respondents’ argument that because the ‘display’ took
place on private property s.2(1) of the IRPA was not applicable. The issue was whether
the events were “before the public”. According to the Board, the evidence showed that
...many of the events which took place during the Aryan Fest were
‘open to general observation’ [a dictionary definition of “public”]. The
Board finds that members of the public who were on the road next to
the Bradley property had a clear view of the ‘burning cross’, ‘Swastika’
and ‘KKK White Power’ sign. The persons who attended as protestors
the media representatives and the persons using the road to go to the
dump, could see the prominently displayed signs and symbols.94

93 Supra note 91 at D/302.
94 Ibid. at D/291.
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The Board further supported its conclusion that the display was “before the public” by
concluding that the ‘Aryan Fest’ was not a private event, but was attended by some
“members of the public.”95
In concluding that the display “indicated discrimination” the Board held that as
a matter of law, “there does not have to be actual act of discrimination for there to be
an indication of discrimination”,96 nor was it necessary to establish that the display
was accompanied by an intention to discriminate. In adopting this interpretation of the
statute the Board relied on the decisions in Sambo’s Pepperpot97 and Bramhill.98
Further, the prohibition applied to discrimination “for any purpose”99—it was not
limited to “the particular modes of discrimination enumerated in the IRPA.”100 In
reaching this conclusion the Alberta Board of Inquiry noted that “[t]he IRPA is not
worded as restrictively as the B.C. Code”,101 and on this basis distinguished Hunky
Bill.102
The Board of Inquiry upheld the complaint and ordered that the respondent
refrain from future displays of the discriminatory signs and symbols in question. The
Board noted that this was “the strongest order we are allowed to make, limited as our
powers are, under the IRPA.”103
The Alberta Board of Inquiry decision in Kane was one of the first cases under
a provincial human rights statute to be decided after the decisions of the Supreme
Court of Canada in R v. Keegstra104 and Taylor v. Canadian Human Rights
Commission.105 As in the case of Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v.
Bell106 (see below, part 4.2), the Supreme Court’s analysis in these two high profile
cases, of the relationship between the right to free speech and legislative restrictions
on hate speech, had a major impact on the Alberta Board of Inquiry’s examination of
the significance of the subsection 2 free speech ‘rider’—a standard though poorly
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
97 Supra note 40.
98 Supra note 70.
99 Supra note 91 at D/295.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid.
102 Supra note 60.
103 Supra note 91 at D/303.
104 Supra note 3.
105 Supra note 4.
106 Infra note 220.
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understood inclusion in provincial human rights statutory provisions dealing with
discriminatory signs and symbols and hate speech.
The Board commenced its analysis of this issue by noting that the sub-section
two rider was almost 50 years old (having first appeared in the ‘prototype’ Ontario
Racial Discrimination Act 1944107) and predated a bill of rights and the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.108 In support of its view that s.2(2) did not provide
an exemption or defence, the Board cited with approval the interpretations of
equivalent provisions preferred in Bramhill (discussed above), Warren and
Chapman109 (discussed below in Part 4.2), and the academic commentary of
Tarnopolsky, who had concluded that the standard ‘sub-section two free speech rider’
was “probably superfluous”.110 The Board endorsed the conclusion of Dickson C.J.C.
in Taylor111:
Perhaps the so-called exemptions found in many human rights
statutes are best seen as indicating to human rights tribunals the
necessity of balancing the objective of eradicating discrimination
with the need to protect free expression.112
On the one hand, the decisions in Kane and Taylor appeared to have settled what had
long been a source of debate—whether subsection 2 offered an exemption to
respondents who were found to have breached subsection 1. However, the now
authoritative interpretation opened up a new debate: what does it mean to balance the
competing rights, and how should adjudicators approach the task of balancing?
Despite expressing reservations about whether “the ‘admonition’ to balance”113 in
s.2(2) required the deployment of an elaborate legal test, the Board decided, “out of an
abundance of caution” to apply the Oakes test,114 which had been applied by the
107 See supra note 22.
108 Charter, supra note 5.
109 [Winnipeg Sun 3], infra note 190
110 Tarnopolsky, supra note 23 at 338, cited supra note 91 at D/297.
111 Supra note 4. These comments were made by the Chief Justice in the course of rejecting Taylor’s

argument that the absence of a ‘free speech rider’ in s.13 of the Canadian Human Rights Act 1977 was
a reason why the prohibition on repeated discriminatory telephone messages should be regarded as
overbroad and therefore unconstitutional as an unjustified infringement of the right to free speech in
s.2(b) of the Charter.
112 Kane, supra note 91 at D/297.
113 Ibid. at D/298.
114 R v. Oakes [1986] 1 S.C.R 103, S.C.J. No.7 at 138-139. The Oakes test requires the court to
consider two issues. First, is the objective of the legislation “of sufficient importance to warrant
overriding a constitutionally protected right or freedom…”? (ibid at 138) Second, are the means
adopted to achieve this objective “reasonable and demonstrably justified”? (ibid at 139). According to
Dickson C.J. this second question requires consideration of whether: (i) the means are “rationally

31

Supreme Court of Canada in relation to the hate speech provisions in s.319 of the
Canadian Criminal Code (Keegstra115) and s.13 of the Canadian Human Rights Act
(Taylor116). The Alberta Board relied heavily on the Supreme Court of Canada’s
analysis of these federal provisions in reaching its conclusion that the objective of
s.2(1) of the Alberta legislation was sufficiently important to limit the right to free
speech, and that the prohibition contained in s.2(1) was a proportionate response.117
Kane was not a ‘borderline’ case in which the Board had to make a hard
decision as to whether the conduct in question was sufficiently harmful to warrant
legislative sanction. Indeed, the Board described the 1990 Aryan Fest as:
…a shocking event in the history of Alberta. The blatant display of
signs and symbols redolent of racial and religious hatred, bigotry and
discrimination challenge the very foundations of our society.118
In the circumstances, very little turned on how the Board chose to articulate free
speech sensitivity into the adjudication process. However, in subsequent decisions in
Alberta and other Canadian provinces (see below, section 3), the style of analysis
endorsed by the Alberta Board of Inquiry has emerged as a complex site of
contestation. This has tended to impact negatively on the achievement of certainty,
clarity and consistency with respect to the reach of legislative restrictions on
expression.
Since Kane, decisions relating to alleged violations of provincial hate speech
restrictions have been made very much in the shadow of Taylor and Keegstra. From
the perspective of those victims of hate speech seeking legal redress, this shadow has
been beneficial, to the extent that it has meant, for the most part, that the question of
the constitutional validity of prohibitions on discriminatory signs and symbols in
provincial human rights legislation has been largely settled.119
On the other hand, as will be discussed below in Part 4, this context may have
contributed to the presence of an undesirable element of unpredictability in the

connected to the objective;” (ii) the means “impair ‘as little as possible’ the right or freedom in
question”; and (iii) there is “proportionality between the effects of the measures…and the objective…”
(ibid. at 139).
115 Supra note 3.
116 Supra note 4.
117 Kane, supra note 91 at D/300.
118 Ibid. at D/302.
119 Some respondents have continued to (unsuccessfully) challenge the constitutional validity of
legislation in those jurisdictions which have enacted broader hate speech prohibitions: see, e.g., Bell 2,
supra note 220; Abrams v. Collins, 2001 B.C.H.R.T. 43; and discussion below (part 4.2).
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decision-making process. Even when the validity of the legislation is not challenged
on free speech grounds, or when any such challenge is quickly dismissed, adjudicators
now commonly take into account free speech considerations when determining the
breadth of the legislative prohibitions on discriminatory and hateful communication.
This has resulted in divergent outcomes with respect to the ‘shape’ given to the
legislative restrictions on communication.
In addition, to further complicate the picture, in some decisions free speech
considerations have received very little explicit consideration. This serves to highlight
the variety of approaches and unpredictability of outcome that are features of the
operation of provincial hate speech laws. The following case is illustrative of this
point.
Kane v. The Silver Bullet120

Harvey Kane, along with the Jewish Defence League of Canada, was again the
complainant in a case involving the distribution in Calgary of several issues of a
newsletter titled “The Silver Bullet” by Milan Papez Sr. and Milan Papez Jr.. The
newsletters contained numerous diatribes directed at various individuals in public
office and community organisations in Alberta, many of whom were alleged to have
victimised the Papez family. “The Silver Bullet” included a number of negative
generalizations and comments about the Jewish and Chinese communities in Calgary,
such as: references to the “Jewish mafia” acting as “Nazis” and controlling “the
government and its institutions, banks politicians, newspapers”;121 calls for a number
of prominent Jewish lawyers to be “jailed in Auschwitz”; and endorsement of the
deportation or mass killing of the Chinese population of Calgary. One issue of “The
Silver Bullet” included a picture of a swastika superimposed on the Canadian flag.
Although the matter was not heard by the Alberta Human Rights and
Citizenship Commission until 2002, the complaint was originally lodged in 1995.
Therefore, it was determined in accordance with the law as it stood at that time—under
the prohibition on discriminatory signs and symbols under s.2 of the Individual Rights
120 Harvey Kane and The Jewish Defence League of Canada v. Milan Papez, Jr., and The Silver Bullet
(13
June
2002)
online:
Alberta
Human
Rights
and
Citizen
Commission
http://www.albertahumanrights.ab.ca/legislation/Panel_Decisions/panel_decis_Kane_Silver_Bullet.asp
[Kane 2].
121 Ibid.
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Protection Act 1980, rather than the broader prohibition on public communications
which promote hatred or contempt which was added in 1996 and which is now
contained in the (renamed) Human Rights, Citizenship and Multiculturalism Act 2000.
On the threshold question of whether the modes of communication employed
by the respondents (“pamphlets, newsletters, letters, memoranda and messages on
sandwich board placards…available to the general public in various locations in the
City of Calgary”122) were covered by the legislation, the Panel adopted an
interpretation of the terms “notice” and “other representation” which was significantly
broader than the interpretation of equivalent provisions adopted previously in other
jurisdictions. These other interpretations had excluded mainstream newspaper opinion
editorials (Winnipeg Sun 3,123 discussed below in Part 4.2) and university student
newspaper articles (Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v. Engineering
Students’ Society124 discussed below in Part 4.2). In particular, “representation” was
defined, with reference to the other listed modes of communication, to mean “a
description, account, or statement of facts, allegations or arguments, especially one
intended to influence action, persuade hearers, make protests, etc.”125 Unsurprisingly,
given this broad definition, the modes of communication employed by the respondents
were regarded by the Panel as falling with s.2(1).
The Panel concluded that by distributing “The Silver Bullet” the respondents
had engaged in conduct that indicated discrimination or an intention to discriminate,
adopting a relatively broad interpretation of the discrimination component:
The respondents have elevated a personal cause or vendetta into a
public forum involving more than the individuals with whom they
have had negative personal interactions. Once in the public forum,
they have attempted to empower their cause by inflaming their
attacks on individuals and classes of persons by the use of language
and image in symbol meant to evoke a strong reaction. They have
singled out persons and classes of persons based on religious
beliefs, race, ancestry and cultural background. They have utilized

122 Ibid.
123 Infra note 190 .
124 Infra note 213.
125 As per Webster’s New World Dictionary (1988), cited in Kane 2, supra note 120. It is possible that

the Panel was persuaded to adopt this broad definition because the 1996 amendments (although not
strictly relevant to this matter) had introduced a modified form of words which clearly included forms
of communication such as newspaper articles: see Human Rights, Citizenship and Multiculturalism Act,
R.S.A. 2000, c. H-14, s.3 (“any statement, publication, notice, sign, symbol, emblem or other
representation”).
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terms and phrases that they know, or ought to have known, have
historical roots of extremely negative, oppressive experiences.
…
The respondents have published and/or displayed powerful
indications of discrimination. The words and symbols they have
chosen embody past and present religious and racial discrimination.

Furthermore, the respondents have gone beyond simply expressing
their own discriminatory views by offering an invitation to discriminate
against others.… The repetitive messages are designed to encourage
others to join them in their discrimination of Jews and Asians.126
The Panel rejected the respondents’ argument that they had “a right to express
their beliefs in anyway they choose”. Consistent with the approach adopted in Kane,
and relying expressly on the opinion of Rooke J. in Re Kane127 (discussed below in
Part 4.2) the Panel held that s.2(2) “provides neither a defence nor a justification for a
breach of Section 2(1)”, but was “an admonition to balance the competing objectives
of freedom of expression and the eradication of discrimination.”128 In concluding that
the balance should be struck “in favour of the protection against discrimination”129 the
Panel took into account the extreme language employed by the respondents and the
frequency of the communications. Somewhat surprisingly, the Panel also took into
account its assessment that the conduct engaged in by the respondents would also
breach the prohibition on communications which expose groups to hatred or
contempt,130 which was operative in Alberta at the time of the hearing and decision
(but which was not strictly applicable to the case at hand, not being in operation at the
time the complaint was lodged in 1995).
The Panel ordered the respondents to refrain from displaying the material in
question and to pay the complainant $2,500.
3.3 Conclusions On the Discriminatory Signs and Symbols Model

126 Supra note 120.
127 Infra note 318.
128 Ibid.
129 Ibid.
130 Human Rights, Citizenship and Multiculturalism Act, supra note 125, s.3(1)(b).
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A number of general observations can be drawn from this examination of seven
decisions handed down in relation to alleged violation of prohibitions on
discriminatory signs and symbols in provincial human rights laws.
First, notwithstanding the success enjoyed by the majority of complainants in
the small number of matters which have been the subject of adjudication by a board,
panel or court, it is clear that the ‘Ontario model’ prohibition on discriminatory signs
and symbols, with its inherent limitations, has only a very marginal role to play as a
legal mechanism for dealing with hate speech. Human rights commissions in a number
of provinces and territories have expressed dissatisfaction with the limitations of the
traditional discriminatory signs and symbols prohibition as a mechanism for
responding to hate speech,131 but only a small number of legislatures have been moved
to enact broader legislative restrictions (see below, Part 4).

131 For example, concern about the limitations of s.11 of the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and
Freedoms, R.S.Q. 1975, c. C-12 [Quebec Charter] (which states that “No one may distribute, publish or
publicly exhibit a notice, symbol or sign involving discrimination, or authorize anyone to do so”) has
been expressed on a number of occasions. In 1981 the Commission des droits de la personne du Quebec
passed a resolution which “condemned movements that, on the basis of race, colour, ethnic or national
origin or religion, perform acts which interfere with the rights of others or incite the performance of
such acts” (Commission des droits de la personne du Quebec, Racist Movements and Incitement of
Discrimination: Declaration by the Commission des droits de la personne (Montreal: Commission des
droits de la personne du Quebec, 10 December, 1994) [Declaration]. The Commission called on the
Quebec Government to “strengthen the law in order to eradicate all forms of incitement of
discrimination” (ibid). No change was made to the Quebec Charter at this time. In 1994, prompted by
evidence of the rise of racist movements in Quebec, the Commission renewed the call for more effective
regulation of racist incitement (Commission des droits de la personne du Quebec, , Les Mouvements
Racistes et la Charte: Document de reflexion by P. Bosset (Montreal: Commission des droits de la
personne du Quebec, 1994)). On 10 December 1994 the Commission issued a declaration which again
recommended amendments to the Quebec Charter:
The reappearance of racist movements reflects an international context marked by an upsurge in
racist ideologies and practices. This is evident in the appearance of openly racist movements in
many societies similar to our own, and by the tragic events in countries that have fallen prey to
forms of “ethnic cleansing”. Although the resurgence of racist movements remains marginal in
Quebec, it nevertheless threatens our social values, and it would be dangerous to look the other
way. Racism in whatever form should not be ignored.
In this context, the Commission believes it is necessary to reassert and update the principles
contained in the Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms. The Charter is the legal incarnation of
Quebec’s social values, and its principles are there to guide the actions of our society and inspire
the actions of the legislator.
Convinced that the exercise of its mandate to fight racism requires a new legislative provision
under which incitement of discrimination would become a civil offence, and in light of the
principles of the Charter, the political commitment of Quebec and the measures taken by other
Canadian provinces, the Commission recommends that the legislator insert in the Charter a
provision to the effect that
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Second, despite the limitations of this model, the small number of
adjudications have brought to the surface the central underlying tensions surrounding
attempts to use the state’s legal authority to regulate racism and other forms of
negative stereotyping, bias and discrimination. The ‘battle lines’ of the controversy
were settled quickly, with some decision-makers committed to making the most of the
limited scope of the legislative restrictions in order to maximize the opportunities for
extending protection to victims (e.g., Sambo’s Pepperpot, Bramhill, Arts Plus), while
others were determined to constrain what they saw as a threat to the important
democratic principle of freedom of communication (The Daily Gleaner, Hunky Bill).
Third, despite divergent opinions and interpretations over the course of two
decades, some clarity has emerged, particularly since the 1992 decision of the Alberta
Board of Inquiry in Kane v. Church of Jesus Christ Christian-Aryan Nations. Most
significantly, from the point of view of this article’s concern with the relationship
between free speech protection and hate speech regulation, by the early-mid 1990’s
the primary point of uncertainty and disagreement around provincial hate speech laws
was no longer around the meaning of the sub-section two free speech ‘rider’, or
whether legislative restrictions were constitutionally valid, but how narrowly or
broadly provincial human rights restrictions on hate speech should be interpreted in
light of s.2(b) of the Charter.132 This represents a subtle but important shift in the
impact of free speech sensitivity on the interpretation and application of hate speech
statutes.
Finally, the Alberta Board of Inquiry’s Kane decision was significant not only
for bringing some focus to the central issues, but for the analytical framework which
it adopted—in the wake of the Supreme Court of Canada’s Keegstra and Taylor
jurisprudence—for defining the scope of legislative restrictions on hate speech. The

“No one may publicly make or circulate hateful or contemptuous statements or commit hateful
or contemptuous acts that incite discriminatory acts. Every person belonging to the target group
may be considered to be a victim of a violation of this provision.”
(Declaration, supra note 131.)
The Quebec National Assembly did not act on this recommendation.
A 2003 review of the operation of the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms recommended
that “the Charter prohibit public incitement of discrimination” (Commission des droits de la personne
et des droits de la jeunesse du Quebec, News Release/Communique, “The Commission des droits de la
personne et des droits de la jeunesse proposes an update of the Charter of Human Rights and
Freedoms” ( 20 November 2003)).
132 Supra note 5.
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Board laid to rest lingering doubts about the constitutional validity of the
discriminatory signs and symbols model prohibition, but it simultaneously and, it
might be said, paradoxically, endorsed the rigorous legal tests used by the Supreme
Court of Canada for determining constitutional validity as the preferred mechanism
for taking into account the need to respect free speech principles when adjudicating
on the merits of individual complaints. It did so with some reluctance, “out of an
abundance of caution,” after expressly wondering whether it would be better to
…simply say we have seriously considered the fact that any order
we make will limit the freedom of expression of the respondents
and that we feel the eradication of discrimination is more important
than their right to display discriminatory signs and symbols.133
The Alberta Board of Inquiry’s preference for the application of complex and
legalistic tests drawn from the Supreme Court of Canada’s constitutional validity
jurisprudence over a relatively ‘simple’ exercise in balancing human rights did not
disadvantage the complainants in Kane. However, as will be demonstrated below, this
‘quasi-constitutional’ approach to the interpretation and application of relevant
provisions has been widely adopted in those jurisdictions which have enacted broader
prohibitions on public communication that exposes identified groups to hatred, with a
net narrowing effect on the scope and quality of the protection afforded to victims of
hate speech.
4. PROVINCIAL LAWS DEALING WITH EXPOSURE TO HATRED OR
CONTEMPT

Part 4 of this article is primarily concerned with examining the operation of
provisions in provincial human rights statutes that prohibit not only discriminatory
signs and symbols, but also a wide variety of methods of public communication of
material that exposes identified groups to hatred or other forms of ill-feeling.
However, attention will first be given to two Canadian provinces that have enacted
‘statutory tort’ mechanisms for allowing victims of racist speech to seek redress in the
conventional civil justice system. In Manitoba (1934) this legislation pre-dated the
growth of provincial human rights legislation and associated administrative
enforcement mechanisms, whereas in British Columbia (1981) it was a direct
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response to the limitations of the conventional discriminatory signs and symbols
prohibition in provincial human rights legislation.
In both cases, the statutory torts model has proven to be of marginal
significance as a legal device for combating hate speech, but a review of its modest
history is worthwhile because it reveals many of the themes regarding the relationship
between the right to free speech and legislative restrictions on hate speech. This
relationship resonated in adjudications over prohibitions on discriminatory signs and
symbols (discussed above in Part 3) and continues to resonate in adjudications over
the broader prohibitions on public communication that promotes hatred, which will be
examined in Part 4.2.
4.1 Statutory Torts134

Manitoba
In 1934 the Manitoba legislature amended135 the Libel Act 1913 to create a cause of
action for group libel as a response to racist hate speech. Like many pioneering hate
speech statutes136 this amendment was a direct response to the activities of a racist
organisation, in this case the Brown Shirt Nationalist organisation, which was active in
Winnipeg at the time.137 The provision is now found in s.19 of the Defamation Act
R.S.M.1987 c. D20:
(1)The publication of a libel against a race, religious creed or sexual
orientation likely to expose persons belonging to the race, professing
the religious creed, or having the sexual orientation to hatred, contempt
or ridicule, and tending to raise unrest or disorder among people shall
entitle a person belonging to the race, professing the religious creed, or
having the sexual orientation to sue for an injunction to prevent the
continuation and circulation of the libel; and the Court of Queen’s
Bench may entertain the action.138

133 Kane supra note 91 at D/298.
134 An earlier version of this discussion of statutory torts in Manitoba and British Columbia was

published as part of McNamara, supra note 10 at 287-294.
135 An Act to amend The Libel Act, R.S.M. 1934, c 23, amending R.S.M. 1913, c. 113.
136 See, for example the discussion of the motivation for the creation of criminal offences of

incitement to racial hatred in Western Australia in 1990: McNamara, supra note 10 at 222-225.
137 Melvin Fenson, “Group Defamation: Is the Cure Too Costly?” (1964-65) 1(3) Man. L. J. 255 at

259 [Fenson].
138 Sexual orientation was added in 2002: The Charter Compliance Act, R.S.M. 2002, c. 24, s.17.
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The threshold established by the legislation is high. In addition to including a
definition based on the common law definition of defamation (conduct likely to
expose to hatred, contempt or ridicule) the definition also requires that the conduct
must have the tendency to “raise unrest and disorder”. The Manitoba Defamation Act
does not provide for the payment of damages; the only remedy available is an
injunction to restrain the defendant from continuing to engage in the conduct in
question. In its 70 years of operation only two cases have ever been decided under the
legislation.
Tobias v. Whittaker139
The first action was commenced on October 30th 1934, just six months after the
amendments came into force on April 7th of that year. In Tobias v. Whittaker the
plaintiff (W.V. Tobias) was a Winnipeg barrister and the defendant (William
Whittaker) was the leader of the Brown Shirts and editor of The Canadian Nationalist.
The plaintiff submitted that two articles published in The Canadian Nationalist on
October 30th 1934, titled “The Murdering Jew, Jewish Ritual Murder” and “The Night
of Murder…Secret of the Purim Festival” constituted racial defamation of Jews
contrary to the legislation. An injunction was granted which restrained the defendant:
…From continuing, writing, printing, or causing to be printed,
circulating, distributing, or otherwise publishing the libel on the Jewish
race and on those professing the Jewish creed, contained in the issue of
The Canadian Nationalist, Volume 2, Number 6, or any similar libels
injuriously affecting those belonging to the Jewish race or professing
the Jewish creed.140
Henson, reflecting on Tobias, said: “in its first…test at bar, the Manitoba group
defamation section proved effective.”141 However it was another 37 years before the
legislation was invoked again.

139 Tobias, supra note 7.
140 Record of unreported trial, quoted in Fenson, supra note 136 at 259. An interim injunction was
issued on 4 November 1934, with a “perpetual injunction granted on 13 February 1935” (ibid).
141 Ibid. at 260. See also Canada, Special Committee on Hate Propaganda in Canada, Report, (Ottawa:
Queen’s Printer, 1966) at 43.
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Courchene v. Marlborough Hotel Co.142

In Courchene v. Marlborough Hotel Co. the plaintiff brought an action for racial
defamation contrary to s.19 of the Defamation Act against a hotel, the manager of
which had published a memo advising staff that “As we are having innumerable
problems with the Indians and Metis coming into this hotel” they were to refuse
accommodation to Indians and Metis customers.143 The next day, when the President
of the defendant company learned of the contents of the memo, it “was at once
repudiated and suitable instructions given that it was to be ignored and that it was not
hotel policy.”144
In the Court of Queen’s Bench, Tritschler C.J. ruled that the memo did not breach
s.19 because it was not defamatory. Amongst the reasons relied upon by the judge
were that the statement in the memo was “true and fair”—given that the hotel had been
having the problems referred to in the memo145—and “[w]hat is true cannot be
defamatory.”146 In addition the judge categorically rejected the plaintiff’s submission
that the memo carried an imputation that “Indians were ‘unsanitary, unfit, undesirable,
troublesome and unsuitable as guests of the hotel’”.147 The judge further held that the
memo was covered by qualified privilege.148
The judge found for the defendant on the merits and also noted that even if the
action had been successful, no injunction would have been “required or granted”149
because the memo had been revoked and repudiated within hours of having been
produced. Foreshadowing some of the concerns raised in the early discriminatory
signs and symbols cases (see above, Part 3), Tritschler C.J. also raised doubts about
the constitutional validity of the legislation:
I am…of the opinion that the section is ultra vires, dealing as it does,
with what is in essence criminal libel. Matters ‘tending to raise unrest

142 (1971), 20 D.L.R. (3d) 109 (Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench) [Marlborough Hotel].
143 Ibid. at 112..
144 Ibid. at 110.
145 Ibid. at 112.
146 Ibid.
147 Ibid.
148 Ibid. at 112-113.
149 Ibid. at 115.
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or disorder among the people’ are for Parliament—which has occupied
the field in the Criminal Code, s.267B.150
The plaintiffs appealed unsuccessfully to the Manitoba Court of Appeal.151
However, in contrast to the trial judge’s characterization of the memo, the Court of
Appeal agreed with the plaintiff that the memo was “defamatory on its face”.152
Freedman C.J. specifically rejected the trial judge’s characterization of the contents of
the memo as truthful, stating, “[p]lainly there were many Indians coming to the
Marlborough Hotel who presented no problem whatever and who behaved themselves
properly. The defence of truth is not available, and the memorandum remains
defamatory.”153 However, the Chief Justice of the Court of Appeal noted that “[t]he
sole remedy under s.19 is an injunction” and in the circumstances (the memo having
been quickly withdrawn) “there was nothing to restrain”.154
Chief Justice Freedman criticized Tritschler C.J.Q.B.’s ‘ruling’ that s.19 was
ultra vires and invalid, describing that part of the trial judgement as “obiter
opinion”155. Chief Justice Freedman ruled that:

…it was not open to the learned trial Judge to adjudge the section to be
constitutionally invalid until after notice of that issue had been given to
the Attorney General of Canada and the Attorney General of
Manitoba….It is similarly not open to this Court to adjudge the section
to be invalid. Since we are unable in this case to decide the
constitutional question, we must proceed on the assumption that the
legislation is valid until otherwise determined.156
A Dead Letter?
Cohen has advanced two primary reasons for what he describes as the “dead letter”157
status of this particular form of legislative regulation of hate speech. The first reason,
reflected in Marlborough Hotel, regarded the constitutional validity of the legislation.
150 Ibid.
151 Courchene v. Marlborough Hotel Co. Ltd. [1972] 1 W.W.R. 149, (1971) 22 D.L.R. (3d) 157
(Manitoba Court of Appeal). [Marlborough Hotel 2, cited to W.W.R.].
152 Ibid. at 151.
153 Ibid. at 153.
154 Ibid.
155 Ibid. at 152.
156 Ibid.
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Doubts as to its validity existed on the basis that under Canada’s Constitution Act
1867, such legislation might be beyond the legislative competence of the provinces,
either on the basis that the legislation effectively criminalized racial defamation, a
form of regulation within the ambit of the federal jurisdiction,158 or because it
regulated freedom of speech, which was also considered to be the exclusive preserve
of the federal Parliament. In 1964, in a report prepared for the National Joint
Community Relations Committee in Toronto, Arthur Maloney expressed the opinion
that the legislation was unconstitutional:
…since freedom of speech and freedom of press is involved, legislative
jurisdiction upon such classes of subjects belongs to the Parliament of
Canada under the peace, order and good government clause and under
the criminal sub-section in the British North America Act, and that a
provincial legislature has no power to legislate in relation to such
classes of subjects.159
However, as noted above (Part 3), the view that provincial attempts to regulate free
speech are invalid because freedom of speech is exclusively a federal matter no longer
finds support.160
The second reason identified by Cohen to explain the very infrequent use of this
particular regulatory option is that the only remedy for racial defamation under the
statute is an injunction, and victims of racial defamation may feel that there is
insufficient personal benefit in commencing an action:
Another factor might be that a plaintiff, suing as a member of a
defamed group, wants more than the cessation of the material which is
libellous. He wants monetary damages for the hurt he suffered because
of the libel. However, to date, the courts have been unwilling to give
such a plaintiff monetary damages because of a theory which has been
elevated to an unspoken presumption which presumes that when groups
are the victims of libellous actions, individuals within the group cannot
be hurt simply because he is a member of the defamed group. Needless
to say this presumption has been rebutted by scientific psychological
experimentation. However, because the courts have not yet seen the
light, it is not worth anyone’s while or expense to sue.161
157 Stephen Cohen, “Hate Propaganda: The Amendments to the Criminal Code” (1971) 17(4) McGill

L. J. 740 at 750-751 [Cohen].
158 Constitution Act, 1867 supra note 80 s. 91(27).
159 Quoted in Fenson, supra note 137 at 260. See also The Daily Gleaner supra note 35.
160 See, e.g., Bramhill supra note 70; Taylor supra note 4; also Walter Tarnopolsky and William.

Pentney, Discrimination and the Law, revised ed. (Toronto: Carswell, revised ed., 1994) at para 1011ff [Tarnopolsky & Pentney].
161 Cohen, supra note 157 at 750-751; see also Errol Mendes (ed), Racial Discrimination Law and
Practice (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) para. 4-44.
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Notwithstanding the merit in the content of Cohen’s argument, its direction at the
courts seems misplaced, at least in relation to the statutory cause of action for group
racial defamation—it is the legislature that has unequivocally chosen to limit the
remedy to an injunction with no facility for the award of damages.
While the limited remedial options may have been an impediment to the
utilisation of s.19 of the Defamation Act, it is unlikely that this is the only reason why
only two cases have ever been decided under s.19. The narrow statutory definition of
group defamation (including the dual proof requirements that the publication must be
both likely to expose members of the target group to hatred, and tend to raise “unrest
or disorder”), as well as financial and other barriers to the commencement of formal
civil proceedings can be assumed to also have had an influence.

British Columbia

In response to the demonstrated inadequacy of the discriminatory signs and symbols
prohibition model, following the controversy over the KKK and the subsequent
McAlpine Report (see above, Part 3), in 1981 the British Columbia provincial
legislature enacted the Civil Rights Protection Act.162 Section 2 of the Act provides:
A ‘prohibited act’ is a tort actionable without proof of damage,
(a) by any person against whom the prohibited act was directed, or
(b) where the prohibited act was directed against a class of persons, by
any member of that class.
A “prohibited act” is defined in s.1 of the Act:
In this Act, ‘prohibited act’ means any conduct or communication by a
person that has as its purpose interference with the civil rights of a
person or class of persons by promoting
(a) hatred or contempt of a person or class of persons, or
(b) the superiority or inferiority of a person or class of persons
in comparison with another or others
on the basis of colour, race, religion, ethnic origin or place of origin.

162 R.S.B.C. 1981, c. 12.
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Damage is not an element of the tort created by the Civil Rights Protection Act.
In addition, the tort created by s.2 of the Act is not limited to public acts—it covers
“any conduct or communication”. The range of remedial options is relatively wide,
including damages, exemplary damages and injunctive relief.163
Where a tort action is commenced under s.2, the plaintiff is obliged to notify
the Attorney General within 30 days.164 Under s.3 of the Act the Attorney General
may intervene165 and become a party to the proceedings.166
The definition of the tort created by s.2 of the Civil Rights Protection Act is
limited to conduct which is done for the “purpose” of bringing about one of the
proscribed consequences. The use of this phrase to express the fault element of the tort
indicates that the fault component is subjective, requiring proof that the defendant
intended to bring about the relevant consequence or knew that the conduct would
probably have this effect. In addition to establishing that the conduct defined by s.1(1)
is a tort, the Act also provides (s.5) that the conduct so defined constitutes a criminal
offence punishable by a $2000 fine or 6 months imprisonment (or a $10,000 fine in the
case of a corporation or society). In this way, it adopts a ‘hybrid’ approach to the
regulation of hate speech, relying on both civil (tort) and criminal approaches.
In his second reading speech on the Civil Rights Protection Bill the Attorney
General of British Columbia at the time, Mr. Williams, explained that the legislation
was designed to respond to racist activity by providing “a means of access to our
courts, a means of remedy which is currently absent in our law.”167 The legislation
was unanimously supported in the Legislative Assembly. Records of the debate during
the second reading reveal no mention of concern that the legislation would adversely
affect free speech.168 The contrast on this issue, between the response to the Civil
Rights Protection Act and the response to the 1993 amendments to the Human Rights
Act 1984 (see below, Part 4.2.3) are striking.

163 Ibid. at s. 4.
164 Ibid. at s. 3(3).
165 Ibid. at s. 3(1).
166 Ibid. at s. 3(2).
167 British Columbia, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates of the Legislative Assembly

(Hansard) (29 June 1981) at 6475.
168 Ibid. at 6474-6477.
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Only one case has been decided under the Civil Rights Protection Act 1981. In
Brochu v. Nelson and British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority169 the plaintiff
claimed that his employer and immediate supervisor had breached s.2 of the Act. The
plaintiff cited the supervisor’s alleged conduct and communication with the plaintiff
(specifically, the supervisor’s allocation of more lucrative tasks to other employees) as
having the purpose of interfering with his civil rights by “promoting the superiority of
others over him, or promoting his inferiority in comparison with others on the basis of
his ethnic origin which is French-Canadian, or place of origin, which is Quebec.”170
Evidence was presented that Nelson had made disparaging remarks about FrenchCanadians referring to them as ‘frogs’ and expressing displeasure that a number of
French-Canadians from Quebec had come to British Columbia to work. McKenzie J.
for the British Columbia Supreme Court doubted the plaintiff’s evidence and was
persuaded by the denial of his supervisor, ruling that “[t]he plaintiff’s case fails at the
threshold because he has not proven on a balance of probabilities that the supervisor
committed any prohibited act”.171 The action was dismissed with costs.
Mirroring Manitoba’s experience with s.19 of the Defamation Act 1987, it
appears that one of the factors contributing to the minimal use of the Civil Rights
Protection Act has been concern about its constitutional validity. At the time of its
enactment the legislation was unanimously supported in the British Columbia
Legislative Assembly. Records of the debate on second reading reveal no mention of
concern that the legislation would adversely affect free speech.172
However, in 1993, during debate on a bill to add a hate speech ground of
complaint to the British Columbia Human Rights Act 1969173 (see below, Part 4.2.3),
Government (New Democratic Party) MLA Mr. Dosanjh observed that although the
Civil Rights Protection Act had never been subject to a constitutional challenge it was
“wide open to challenge under the Charter” on the basis of an infringement of the
right to freedom of expression.174 In particular Mr. Dosanjh suggested that the Civil
Rights Protection Act was actually too broad in its regulatory scope because it covered

169 [1986] BCJ No 998 (BCSC) (QL) [Brochu].
170 Ibid. at para. 2.
171 Ibid. at para. 14.
172 British Columbia Hansard, supra note 163.
173 R.S.B.C. 1969, c. 10.
174 British Columbia, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates of the Legislative Assembly

(Hansard) 11 (1) (10 June 1993), at 7061.
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both public and private communications.175 Mr. Dosanjh continued (presumably
unaware of the decision in Brochu):
I don’t remember the Civil Rights Protection Act being used in the last
12 years in British Columbia, because in the form it was brought to this
House it was unusable. It was a laudable piece of legislation, but
unusable. It was impractical because it criminalized the process, which
meant you had a higher onus of proof. In the civil aspect of it, it also
took the matter into the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court rather than
the lower courts, which are much simpler for people to deal with.176
Although the Civil Rights Protection Act has not been repealed, in 1993 it was
effectively replaced177 as the preferred legislative regime for the regulation of hate
speech by s.7 of the British Columbia Human Rights Code (see below, Part 4.2.3).
4.2 Provincial Human Rights Law Provisions

Legislatures in five Canadian jurisdictions have broadened the conventional
prohibition on discriminatory signs and symbols into a prohibition on a relatively wide
range of hate speech types. On their face, the laws which currently operate in British
Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, and the Northwest Territories, and the law which
operated in Manitoba between and 1976 and 1987, appear to offer broader protection
to victims of hate speech, by generally covering a wider range of public
communication methods, and by prohibiting conduct which is likely to have any one
of a number of negative consequences—from discrimination, to hatred and contempt,
and, in the case of Saskatchewan, ridicule, belittlement, or an affront to dignity.
It is not surprising then, that in the 10 decisions which have been handed down
by provincial boards, panels, tribunals and courts over the course of more than two
decades,178 this model of provincial hate speech law has generally been regarded as
representing an even greater threat to the right to free speech than the traditional
discriminatory signs and symbols prohibition. As will be demonstrated in the
following discussion, while the issue of constitutional validity has been addressed on a
number of occasions, the most significant way in which free speech sensitivity has
175 Ibid. at 7062.
176 Ibid.
177 The Deputy Premier and Minister Responsible for Multiculturalism and Human Rights explained

during the second reading speech on the Human Rights Amendment Bill that the new ground of
complaint would “replace” the Civil Rights Protection Act 1981: supra note 174 at 7057.
178 As at 31 March 2004.

47

manifested in public adjudications is as a motivation for the adoption of restrictive
tests for determining the scope and application of the prohibition in a given instance.
The net result has been that notwithstanding the decision of the legislatures to broaden
the scope of the prohibition, thereby improving the protection afforded to targets of
hate speech, in practice, the threshold that must be satisfied in order to establish a
breach of the legislation remains high.
4.2.1 Manitoba

Following its enactment of Canada’s first ‘hate speech’ statute in 1934, Manitoba
achieved another first in 1976 when it became the first province in Canada to prohibit
not only conduct which indicated discrimination or an intention to discriminate, but in
addition, conduct which incited hatred. Following the enactment of the Human Rights
Amendment Act 1976179, s.2 of the Human Rights Act 1974180, provided that:
(1) No person shall

(a) publish, display, transmit or broadcast, or cause to be published,
displayed, transmitted or broadcast; or
(b) permit to be published, displayed, broadcast or transmitted to the
public, on lands or premises, in a newspaper, through television or
radio or telephone, or by means of any other medium which he owns or
controls;

any notice, sign, symbol, emblem or other representation

(c) indicating discrimination or intention to discriminate against a
person; or
(d) exposing or tending to expose a person to hatred;

179 R.S.M. 1976, c. 48.
180 R.S.M. 1974, c. 65.

48

because of the race, nationality, religion, colour, sex, marital status,
age, source of income, family status, ethnic or national origin of that
person.
At the second reading of the bill in the Manitoba legislature, the Attorney
General at the time, Howard Pawley, explained the rationale for the addition to s.2 of
the words “exposing or tending to expose persons to hatred”:
This is a result of legal opinion in respect to the weakness of the
present provisions insofar as enforcement is concerned. It would be
very difficult to ever obtain a conviction under this section. It ties in
closely with the old Manitoba Defamation Act which was passed back
in 1934 in connection with class actions pertaining to libel against
groups of people as a result of race, religious creed, etc.181
Surprisingly, and in stark contrast to the heated debate surrounding the expansion of
the hate speech provisions of British Columbia’s human rights legislation in 1993 (see
below, Part 4.2.3), the amendment of s.2 of Manitoba’s Human Rights Act in 1976
attracted no adverse comment or criticism during the legislative debate on the bill.
Opposition criticism of the bill tended to focus on other matters, including concerns
about the scope of Manitoba Human Rights Commission and Board of Inquiry
powers.182
The Attorney General’s statements that s.2 was amended in 1976 so as to make
it easier to enforce is curious. Certainly, in one important sense the amended
legislation was broader in scope than its predecessor: it prohibited certain conduct that
either indicated discrimination or promoted hatred. Therefore, the change widened the
range of consequences that would bring conduct within the prohibition. This was an
important development. As demonstrated in Part 3 of the article, so long as the
prohibition applied only to representations which indicated discrimination (or an
intention to discriminate) the coverage of provincial human rights legislation with
respect to hate speech would remain very limited indeed.
However, the amendments made no change to another very substantial
constraint on the scope of s.2—the mode of representation. Even after the 1976
amendments only a narrow range of communication forms was covered by the
legislation: the display of notices, signs, symbols, or emblems or other representations.
181 Manitoba, Legislative Assembly, Debates and Proceedings (Hansard) (7 May 1976) at 3454.
182 See, e.g., Manitoba, Legislative Assembly, Debates and Proceedings (Hansard) (21 May, 1976) at

4130-4131 (Mr. Axworthy); and Manitoba, Legislative Assembly, Debates and Proceedings (Hansard)
(28 May 1976) at -4379 (Mr. Spivak).

49

If, in drafting the 1976 amendments, the Manitoba legislature’s objective had been to
give s.2 ‘more teeth’, it is surprising that the section was not re-worded to apply to a
wider range of forms of representation or communication. It is likely that this
constraint had been just as significant as the limitation to discriminatory
representations in making it “very difficult” to prove a breach of s.2. Perhaps it was
considered that the inclusion of the collective term “other representations” at the end
of the list of prohibited forms of representation made the section sufficiently broad to
catch discriminatory or vilifying expressions, however represented. Unfortunately, the
Manitoba courts did not share this view.
Winnipeg Sun183

In 1983 two Aboriginal men, Kenneth Linklater and Chief Louis Stevenson of the
Peguis Indian Band, lodged a complaint with the Manitoba Human Rights
Commission alleging that two articles written by Peter Warren and published in The
Winnipeg Sun newspaper breached s.2(1) of the Human Rights Act 1974. The
complainants claimed that Warren had stereotyped an Aboriginal person to be “a
drunk, a wastrel, an idlemonger, a person who is only too happy to live on a
government cheque, an in-breeder, a parasite, a non-contributor...”.184 A Board of
Adjudication was appointed to hear and decide the matter. However, the merits of the
complaint—that is, whether the articles in question amounted to hate speech—were
never addressed. A preliminary objection to the complaint was raised by the
respondents who argued that newspaper articles did not come within the definition of
“notice, sign, symbol, emblem or other representation” and therefore were not covered
by s.2(1) of the Human Rights Act irrespective of their content.
The Board of Adjudication rejected the respondents’ argument, stating that
It is clear that in Section 2(1) the legislature considered publishing in
newspapers. I am satisfied that the phrase ‘other representation’
includes journalistic or editorial comment.… The stated purpose of the
Section is to prevent discrimination against person(s) or the exposure of
any person(s) to hatred because of the criteria mentioned therein.185

183 Linklater v. The Winnipeg Sun (1984), 5 C.H.H.R. D/2098 (Man. Bd. Adj.) [Winnipeg Sun].
184 Complaint filed by Chief Louis Stevenson, 31 March, 1984, ibid. at 2099.
185 Ibid. at 2102.

50

The Board of Adjudication also rejected the respondents’ argument that s.2(2)
“permitted unrestricted editorial or journalistic comment”:186
It would appear unrealistic that on the one hand the legislature would
enact enlightened legislation whose object was to lessen discrimination
of all types and on the other hand would concurrently enact in the same
statute legislation which would permit absolutely any type of
discriminatory remark or comment and excuse same under the guise of
freedom of expression.187
Warren applied to the Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench for an order of
prohibition to prevent the Board of Adjudication from continuing its inquiry. Morse J.
ruled that the newspaper articles written by Warren did not constitute “any notice,
sign, symbol, emblem or other representation” for the purpose of s.2(1). Therefore, the
Board of Adjudication had no jurisdiction to deal with the complaints.188 Morse J.
rejected a submission made by the Manitoba Human Rights Commission that the
Human Rights Act “should be...given such fair, large and liberal construction and
interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects...” and that “[t]he objects of
the Act...would not be attained unless all discrimination in newspaper journalism was
covered by s.2(1).” Morse J. stated that:
I am of the view that the Legislature did not intend to cover all forms or
manner of discriminatory expression. If this had been intended, the
Legislature could very easily have said so. The specific words chosen
demonstrate, in my opinion, an intention to be selective.189
The records of parliamentary debates at the time of the 1976 amendments do
not provide any indication as to whether the Manitoba legislature made a conscious
decision to limit the prohibition to particular modes of communication. However, it is
possible. Yet, it seems equally plausible that the legislature simply retained the “signs
and symbols” formulation that had long been standard in provincial human rights
legislation, without realising that the retention of this limitation was contrary to the
general tenor of the 1976 reforms—to broaden the scope of the prohibition on the
promotion of hatred.
In any event, an appeal by the Manitoba Human Rights Commission to the
Manitoba Court of Appeal against the order made by Morse J. was unsuccessful. The
186 Ibid.
187 Ibid. at 2103.
188 Warren and Chapman, [1984] 5 W.W.R. 454, (1984) 11 D.L.R. (4th) 474 at 479 (Man QB)
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Court held that Morse J. had been incorrect in concluding that a newspaper article was
not a representation for the purpose of s.2(1).190

Repeal of the “Exposure to Hatred” Prohibition

Manitoba’s experiments with prohibitions on hate speech in human rights legislation
took another twist in 1987 as part of an overhaul of Manitoba’s human rights
legislation. The Manitoba Human Rights Act 1974 was repealed and replaced by the
Human Rights Code R.S.M. 1987 c. H175. The provision dealing with exposure to
hatred and contempt was repealed and Manitoba reverted to a narrower prohibition on
discriminatory communications.
Section 18 of the Human Rights Code now provides that:
No person shall publish, broadcast, circulate or publicly display, or
cause to be published, broadcast, circulated or publicly displayed, any
sign, symbol, notice or statement that
(a) discriminates or indicates intention to discriminate in respect of an
activity or undertaking to which this Code applies; or
(b) incites, advocates or counsels discrimination in respect of an
activity or undertaking to which this Code applies;
unless bona fide and reasonable cause exists for the discrimination.
This provision simultaneously expands and contracts the scope of s.2 of the
1974 Human Rights Act, as amended in 1976. On the issue of the mode of
communication, s.18 expressly applies to statements as well as notices, signs and
symbols. This change amounts to a legislative reversal of the decision of the Manitoba
Court of Appeal in Re Warren and Chapman191 and represents a (potentially)
substantial expansion of the scope of the prohibition. However, with respect to the
range of consequences covered by the prohibition, s.18 represents a retreat back from
the incitement or promotion of hatred, to discrimination.
In his second reading speech on the 1987 amendments, Attorney General
Roland Penner, offered the following explanation for the changes to the hate speech
provisions in Manitoba’s human rights legislation:
189 Ibid. at 479.
190 Warren and Chapman, [1985] 4 W.W.R. 75, (1985) 17 D.L.R. (4th) 261 (Man CA) [Winnipeg Sun
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First of all, of course, you will recall that in the Peter Warren case, the
courts found against the Human Rights Commission in that particular
prosecution, but there are concerns that go beyond that, where
particularly because of the guarantee of freedom of speech in the
Charter, it is said that one ought not to use the force of law to prohibit
even extreme forms of speech. So you have within the civil rights,
human rights constituency itself some concerns about how to use the
law, if at all, in that area. I must say understand and I share those
concerns.
So what we’ve attempted to do in the rewriting of that section is to
make it very, very specific, and that it’s only if the statement or sign or
notice discriminates or indicates discrimination that it comes within the
purview of the act. So it’s clear that the simple expression of ideas
itself is not intended to be covered by this act and we hope, expect, that
the section as written will not conflict with section 2 of the Charter.192
The Manitoba Attorney General’s comments give a strong illustration of the
way in which free speech sensitivity, amplified by the Supreme Court of Canada’s
Charter jurisprudence, which was just emerging during the 1980s, has impacted on the
scope of provincial human rights laws dealing with hate speech. However, there are
two things that are distinctive about the Manitoba experience. First, for the most part,
the tendency towards the narrow construction of hate speech restrictions has generally
occurred in judicial or quasi-judicial settings, whereas in the case of Manitoba’s 1987
amendments, the narrowing was effected by the legislature. Second, Attorney General
Penner’s comments suggest that the amendment was an attempt to ‘pre-empt’ scrutiny
of the constitutional validity of Manitoba’s hate speech laws, or to immunize them
from challenge. Ironically, if the prohibition which operated in Manitoba between
1976 and 1987 was assessed in accordance with the principles and rules laid down by
the Supreme Court just a few years later,193 it is clear that the broader prohibition
would still have passed constitutional muster, as has established by subsequent court
and tribunal decisions in other provinces.
The Manitoba example highlights the wide variety of views regarding the
legitimacy of legislative restrictions on hate speech, and the degree to which
authoritative statements of these different views are prone to fluctuate over time. In
1987 the Manitoba legislature decided to readjust the legal boundary between

191 Ibid.
192 Manitoba, Legislative Assembly, Debates and Proceedings (Hansard), Volume XLVII NO. 54 (3
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protected free speech and unlawful hate speech at the macro-level of legislative
amendment. Since this time, a process of negotiation and re-negotiation has continued
to take place in those other provinces where the broader model of hate speech laws has
been in operation. Although this boundary negotiation has mainly taken place at the
micro-level of case-by-case judicial and quasi-judicial interpretation and adjudication,
it has nonetheless been an important part of the ongoing task of resolving the tension
between competing human rights.
4.2.2 Saskatchewan

In 1979, as part of a consolidation and overhaul of human rights laws, Saskatchewan
replaced its narrow “discriminatory signs and symbols” provision with a broader
restriction on the promotion of ill-feeling against identified groups. Section 14 of the
Saskatchewan Human Rights Code 1979 provided:
No person shall publish or display, or cause or permit to be published
or displayed, on any lands or premises or in a newspaper, through a
television or radio broadcasting station or any other broadcasting
device or in any printed matter or publication or by means of any other
medium that he owns, controls, distributes or sells, any notice, sign,
symbol, emblem or other representation tending or likely to tend to
deprive, abridge or otherwise restrict the enjoyment by any person or
class of persons of any right to which he is or they are entitled under
the law, or which exposes, or tends to expose, to hatred, ridicules,
belittles, or otherwise affronts the dignity of, any person, any class of
persons or a group of persons because of his or their race, creed,
religion, colour, sex, marital status, physical disability, age, nationality,
ancestry or place of origin.194
The specific motivation for the broadening of Saskatchewan’s prohibition on
discriminatory signs and symbols is unclear. It is possible that it was modelled on the
provisions which had been enacted in Manitoba just a few years earlier, but the records
of parliamentary debates on the 1979 Saskatchewan Human Rights Code do not
provide any guidance as to what prompted the expansion of the legislation prohibition.
In the second reading speech in the Legislative Assembly, Attorney General Roy
Romanow made no mention of the broadened hate speech provision. The main focus

194 Saskatchewan Human Rights Code, R.S.S. 1979, c. S-24.1, s. 14 [Emphasis added].
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of the speech was on the extension of the grounds195 of unlawful discrimination under
the Code.196
In terms of the harmful consequences to which it applied, the 1979 changes
made s.14(1) of the Saskatchewan Human Rights Code the broadest of the Canadian
provincial hate speech laws—that is, it included not only hatred and contempt, but also
ridicule, belittlement, and affront to dignity. However, in one key respect, the types of
communication covered by the prohibition, the legislation retained the narrowness of
most equivalent Canadian statutes. Section 14(1) applied to communication in the
form of a “notice, sign, symbol, emblem or other representation”. The limiting effect
of this form of words on the scope of the legislation was confirmed in the first highprofile matter under s.14 to come before the Saskatchewan Human Rights
Commission and the Saskatchewan courts, and led to further amendments in 1989 (see
below). However, in the first case to be decided under the expanded s.14, the mode of
communication fell squarely within the ambit of the prohibition.
McKinlay v. Cranfield and Dial Agencies197

In 1980 Penny McKinlay lodged a complaint with the Saskatchewan Human Rights
Commission alleging that a letter which she had seen displayed in the window of a
Saskatoon rental accommodation agency, Dial Agencies, breached s.14. The letter had
been placed there by Cranfield, General Manager of Dial Agencies. It was an open
letter to the Premier of Saskatchewan expressing dissatisfaction with the Department
of Social Services with whom Cranfield had recently dealt in the context of a dispute
with a tenant. After describing what he regarded as poor service by an employee of the
Department, the letter included the following:
After talking to this person I would highly recommend the
government of this province hire the handicapped; the situation

195 The 1979 Code added the grounds of marital status, age and physical disability.
196 Saskatchewan, Legislative Assembly, Hansard (23 April 1979) at 1951-1952. THIS YEAR IS

NOT AVAILABEL AT THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY WEBSITE. please USE YOUR SOURCE
TO ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE THE CORRECT TITLE (JUST STATINGF HANSARD IS NOT
SUFFICENT ACCORDING TO McGill) AS WELL AS VOLUME OR ISSUE NUMBER. PLEASE
ALSO ENSURE THAT ANY RELATED QUOTES ARE CORRECT. SORRY – I ONLY HAVE
HAND WRITTEN NOTE – VOLUME NUMBER NOT RECORDED
197 (1980) 1 C..H.R.R. D/246 (Sask. Bd. Inq.) [McKinlay].
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could only improve if they hired mentally retarded too. Or is this
being done already?198
The complainant, who suffered from epilepsy, argued that the letter/notice
“equated physical disability with incompetency,” and tended to perpetuate the
stereotype “that the physically handicapped cannot do a good job.”199 The
Saskatchewan Board of Inquiry found that a reasonable person would regard the letter
as ridiculing, belittling or affronting the dignity of persons with a physical disability. It
was irrelevant that Cranfield did not intend his letter to have this effect. The Board
held that the respondents had contravened s.14 of the Saskatchewan Human Rights
Code, and ordered that the offending sentences be deleted from any copy of the letter
displayed or published by the respondents in the future.

Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission v. Waldo et al and The Engineering
Students’ Society, University of Saskatchewan200

In 1981 Kathleen Storrie, an Assistant Professor of Sociology at the University of
Saskatchewan, lodged a complaint with the Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission
alleging that material contained in two issues of the Red Eye newspaper published by
the Engineering Students’ Society at the University breached s.14 by ridiculing,
belittling and affronting the dignity of women.201
In 1984 a Board of Inquiry upheld the complaint.202 After reviewing the
contents of the student newspaper issues in question, the Board observed:
The manner in which women were ‘belittled’ and had their dignity
affronted because of their sex involved material suggesting that
women in educational institutions are less than human; that they are
inferior beings; that they are there to gratify male sexual desires;
that they have no independent motivation or capacity to participate
in social and intellectual activity. Women are belittled by being
represented as mere objects, their dignity or quality of being worthy
is depreciated. The material further affronts the dignity of women
by trivializing and deriving humour from material which promotes
sexual violence and the objectification of women. The material
198 Ibid at D/246.
199 Ibid. at D/247.
200 (1984) 5 C.H.R.R. D/2074 [Red Eye].
201 See generally, Wanda Wiegers, “Feminist Protest and the Regulation of Misogynist Speech: A
Case Study of Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission v Engineering Students’ Society” (1992) 24
Ottawa L. Rev. 363.
202 Supra note 200.
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repeatedly represents women, in general, as less than human. In
places the newspapers promote violence and demeaning treatment
of women because of their sex.203
In response to the respondents’ contention that a finding that the Red Eye
publications violated s.14(1) would constitute “improper censorship” and would be
“totally contrary to the basic rights of freedom of expression”,204 the Board of Inquiry
undertook a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between freedom of expression
and legislative restrictions on hate speech of the type contained in s.14(1). The Board
acknowledged that human rights laws like the Saskatchewan Human Rights Code do
involve the “difficult task of reconciling two competing social interests”.205 It
concluded that this reconciliation may be legitimately “accomplished through
restrictions on the scope of the freedom of expression by legislative and judicial
means”, and observed that “[t]he phrase ‘under the law’ in Section 14(2) clearly
acknowledges this type of restriction in the Code”.206
The Board declared that material contained in the two issues of the Red Eye did
breach s.14(1) and was “not protected by the freedom of expression”.207 It ordered that
there be no further dissemination of the two issues in question, that the Engineering
Students’ Society distribute copies of the Board’s findings along with the next issue of
the Red Eye, and that the staff of the Red Eye and the executive of the ESS attend
Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission workshops.
One of the respondents, David Hoffer, appealed to the Saskatchewan Court of
Queen’s Bench.208 The main grounds of appeal were that:

i) the prohibition in s.14(1) on exposure to hatred, ridicule, belittling or
affront to dignity was invalid by virtue of inconsistency with the right
to freedom of expression in s.2(b) of the Charter;

ii) the prohibition in s.14(1) on exposure to hatred, ridicule, belittling or
affront to dignity was a criminal law and therefore beyond the power of
a provincial legislature;
203 Ibid. at D/2088.
204 Ibid. at D/2080.
205 Ibid.
206 Ibid.
207 Ibid. at D/2094.
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iii) the Board of Inquiry failed to consider whether the newspaper
material which was the subject of the complaint fell within the
definition

of

“any

notice,

sign,

symbol,

emblem

or

other

representation”.

Milliken J. declined to consider the first ground because the two issues of the Red Eye
in question were published before the Charter came into force.209
The second ground was reminiscent of one of the concerns raised by the
Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench in 1971210, but one might have expected that more
than a decade later the jurisprudence regarding the distribution of law-making capacity
under Canadian federalism would have been sufficiently settled for judges to give such
arguments short shrift. On the contrary, Milliken J. held, in effect, that the 1979
amendments to Saskatchewan’s human rights legislation—that is, the prohibition of
conduct which exposed an individual or group to hatred, ridicule, belittling or affront
to dignity—if interpreted and applied without requiring evidence of an enhanced risk
of discrimination against the target group, was ultra vires because this would place the
laws in conflict with the criminal offences covering hate propaganda which the
Canadian Parliament had already created. According to Milliken J. the provincial lawmaking authority was limited to the prohibition of conduct that was likely to promote
discrimination.211 Even more surprisingly, on further appeal the Saskatchewan Court
of Appeal effectively endorsed this narrow construction of s.14(1), although it rejected
the ultra vires characterization (see below).
Justice Milliken also upheld the appellant’s argument that the Board had failed
to limit its examination to those modes of communication that were covered by the
phrase “any notice, sign, symbol, emblem or other representation”. Justice Milliken
quoted extensively from, and applied the reasoning of, Morse J. in Winnipeg Sun 2212
in concluding that the Board had inappropriately treated articles in the Red Eye as
falling within the s.14 prohibition.
208 Hoffer v. Havemann (1986), 7 C.H.R.R. D/3443 (Saskatchewan QB) [Red Eye 2].
209 Ibid. at D/3451.
210 See Marlborough Hotel, supra note 142.
211 Milliken J. was heavily influenced by the academic commentary of Tarnopolsky, supra note 23 at

337-338.
212 Winnipeg Sun 2, supra note 188.
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The Court of Queen’s Bench allowed the appeal and quashed the Board of
Inquiry’s decision and orders. An appeal by the Saskatchewan Human Rights
Commission to the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal on questions of law was
unsuccessful.213 By majority,214 the Court largely confirmed the correctness of Justice
Milliken J.’s analysis and findings.
On the question of the modes of communication covered by s.14, Cameron
J.A. of the Court of Appeal concluded that the wording of s.14(1) made it clear that
the prohibition did not apply to statements generally, but only to particular forms of
communication. In reaching this conclusion, Cameron J.A. observed:
The provision simply does not have that kind of sweep. If it had, it
would gather in statements in newspapers, magazines, books,
movies, songs, plays, performances, dissertations, and the like. In
other words, whatever the medium and whatever their form,
messages reinforcing prejudice and fostering discrimination would
be prohibited, subject only to the right to free speech.…
It is not for us to say why the legislature chose to limit the scope of
the section, but limit it it did, and we respect that. And that raises
the central dilemma of this case. The purpose of the Act pulls in one
direction, the cast of the section in another.215
On the other major issue raised by the Red Eye litigation, Cameron J.A.
confirmed that in order to protect it from constitutional invalidity as ultra vires the
province, s.14(1) had to be read as requiring not merely that the message in question
ridiculed, belittled or affronted the dignity of the person or class, but in addition it
must be “such as to cause or be likely to cause others to engage in one or more of the
discriminatory practices prohibited” by the Code.216 The somewhat perverse effect of
this decision was that it largely nullified the effect of the 1979 widening of the
consequences component of the prohibition, by reading down the phrase “exposes, or
tends to expose, to hatred, ridicules, belittles, or otherwise affronts the dignity” so as
to require evidence of discriminatory effect—a harm which was already largely

213 Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v. Engineering Students’ Society (1989), 56 D.L.R.

(4th) 604, 72 Sask. RT. 161 (Sask CA) [Red Eye 3, cited to D.L.R.].
214 Cameron and Wakeling J.J.A.; Vancise J.A. dissenting.
215 Supra note 213 at 623. In his dissent, at 657, Vancise J.A. approved a broad interpretation of
“other representation” so as to include newspaper articles on the basis that human rights legislation, as
“special” legislation, should be interpreted generously, and that to fail to do so would risk impairing or
defeating the “broad social purposes of the Code”.
216 Ibid. at 621.
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covered under the traditional ‘Ontario model’ prohibition.217 The correctness of this
approach is even more questionable when it is recognised that it is underpinned by an
unjustified conflation of laws affecting free speech with federal criminal law
jurisdiction under s.91(27) of the Constitution Act 1867, and an unexplained
confinement of provincial jurisdiction in the area of “Civil Rights” under s.92(13) of
the Constitution Act 1867 to anti-discrimination laws.218
Nonetheless, the majority’s restrictive interpretation in Red Eye 3 has become
entrenched as the authoritative interpretation of the scope of s.14(1), as the next
decision to come before the Saskatchewan courts confirmed. This decision, therefore,
represents yet another example of the way in which free speech sensitivity has served
to narrow the scope of provincial human rights laws dealing with hate speech, albeit in
a different form than it has operated in other (more recent) cases. That is, it operated in
conjunction with a particular view of the distribution of law-making authority between
the Canadian Parliament and the provincial legislatures.
On the other side of the ledger, the Red Eye litigation highlighted the modes of
communication limitation in s.14(1) and brought it to the attention of the
Saskatchewan legislature, which promptly amended the legislation in 1989 to cover all
forms of communication. Section 14(1) now applies to “…any representation,
including, without restricting the generality of the foregoing, any notice, sign, symbol,
emblem, article, statement or other representation”.219

Constitutional Validity and Narrow Construction Confirmed: Saskatchewan Human
Rights Commission v. Bell220

The question of constitutional validity was again raised for consideration in
Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission v. Bell, albeit in a different form than had
been addressed in the Red Eye litigation. The 1994 decision of the Saskatchewan

217 So much for the principle of respecting the wishes of the legislature—which had been earlier raised

by Cameron J.A. in confirming the narrow reach of the legislation in terms of modes of
communication– see above, note 215.
218 In dissent, Vancise J.A. (supra note 215 at 650-651) held that there was no operational conflict
between the hate propaganda provisions contained in the Canadian Criminal Code and s.14 of the
Saskatchewan Human Rights Code 1979.
219 R.S.S. 1989-90, c. 23, s.9.
220 (1992), 88 D.L.R. (4th) 71, [1992] 2 W.W.R. 1 (Sask. QB) [Bell cited to D.L.R.]; (1994), 114
D.L.R. (4th) 370, [1994] W.W.R. 458 (Sask. CA) [Bell 2 cited to D.L.R.].
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Court of Appeal was the first (and to date, only) occasion where a provincial appellate
court had been called upon to adjudicate directly on the relationship between a
provincial hate speech prohibition and the right to freedom of expression contained in
s.2(b) of the Charter. After becoming aware that Eugene Bell, the proprietor of the
“Chop Shop Motorcycle Parts” business in Saskatoon was selling three stickers which
depicted the faces of “persons of black, oriental and East Indian origin…[with] a red
circle surrounding the face and a red stroke through the face,”221 the Saskatchewan
Human Rights Commission made an application in the Saskatchewan Court of
Queen’s Bench for an injunction to restrain Bell from selling or displaying the
stickers on the basis that to do so was a contravention of s.14 of the amended
Saskatchewan Human Rights Code. Hunter J. ruled that the Commission did not have
standing to seek an injunction, but recognised that another plaintiff added during the
course of the proceedings, Manohar Sing Ahluwalia, President of the Sikh Society of
Saskatoon, did have standing.222 The main issue addressed by the Court of Queen’s
Bench was the constitutional validity of s.14. In the wake of the Supreme Court of
Canada’s decisions in Keegstra,223 and Taylor,224 the Saskatchewan Human Rights
Commission conceded that s.14 did infringe the right to freedom of expression and so
the specific issue before the Court was whether this infringement could be justified in
accordance with s.1 of the Charter.225 Much of Hunter J.’s judgement is devoted to a
discussion and application of the tests for constitutional validity laid down by the
Supreme Court of Canada in Oakes,226 as employed in the hate speech cases of
Keegstra and Taylor. In

determining whether s.14

represented

a legitimate

infringement of the right to freedom of expression, Hunter J. focused on the
prohibition within s.14(1)(b) on conduct which “tends to expose to hatred, ridicules,
belittles or otherwise affronts the dignity of…”.227 Significantly, the Saskatchewan
Human Rights Commission conceded, following the decision of the Saskatchewan

221 Bell, ibid. at 74 .
222 Ibid.at 99.
223 Supra note 3.
224 Supra note 4.
225 Section 1 of the Charter, supra note 5, states: “The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms

guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law
as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”
226 R v. Oakes, supra note 114.
227 Bell, supra note 220 at 90.
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Court of Appeal in Red Eye 3,228 that “only those messages which have a
discriminatory effect by attacking the human dignity of groups and individuals are
prohibited by s.14”.229 There is a degree of hostility in the judgement of Hunter J.
towards the restriction on free speech imposed by s.14. After observing that “one’s
initial reaction is that it seems to be an undue restriction on the freedom of
expression”230, Hunter J. stated that she was nonetheless “bound to follow”231 the
Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Taylor, and held that s.14 was saved by s.1 of
the Charter.
Justice Hunter’s reluctance to endorse the legitimacy of s.14 was also evident
in her disposition of the application on its merits. Without expressing a conclusion as
to whether the stickers violated s.14, Hunter J. did issue the injunction sought, but only
in relation to “the sticker which depicts the caricature of a person of East Indian
origin”232, on the basis that the representative of the Sikh community was the only
plaintiff with standing.
Bell appealed and the Commission cross-appealed to the Saskatchewan Court
of Appeal.233 The Court of Appeal’s decision is best known for its confirmation that
s.14 is constitutionally valid, notwithstanding that it infringes the right to freedom of
expression in s.2(b) of the Charter. Applying Taylor, the Court confirmed that the
aspect of s.14 which prohibits conduct involving exposure to hatred was
“unquestionably a reasonable limit”.234 In addition, the Court held that that part of s.14
which prohibited conduct which “ridicules, belittles or affronts dignity” was also a
reasonable limit, noting that it was confident that this phrase would not be interpreted
as setting too low a threshold, particularly in light of the presence of the statement in
s.14(2) that “[n]othing in subsection (1) restricts the right to freedom of speech under
the law upon any subject.”
It is likely that one of the reasons why the Court found it unnecessary to set out
a detailed defence of its validity conclusion was that it already regarded it as settled
that s.14 should be read down in accordance with the earlier Saskatchewan Court of

228 Red Eye 2, supra note 208.
229 Bell, supra note 220 at 91.
230 Ibid. at 94.
231 Ibid.
232 Ibid. at 99.
233 Bell 2, supra note 220.
234 Ibid. at 381 per Sherstobitoff J.A..
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Appeal decision in Red Eye 3.235 This is evident in the manner in which the Court laid
out what would be need to be established in order to be satisfied that, in selling the
stickers, Bell had breached s.14(1):
…Bell was guilty of a s.14(1) discriminatory practice if he:
(1) published or displayed on any land or premises,
(2) a notice, sign, symbol, emblem, article, statement or other
representation,
(3) the purpose or effect of which,
(a) exposed or tended to expose to hatred, belittled, ridiculed or
otherwise affronted the dignity of the racial and religious groups
depicted therein; and
(b) caused or tended to cause others to engage in a discriminatory
practice against those groups of persons in contravention of Part II
of the Code.236
The Court of Appeal did not attempt to defend the judicial addition of the
emphasised portion to the wording of s.14(1) endorsed by the Saskatchewan
legislature, but simply offered this formulation after endorsing and quoting extensively
from the judgement of Cameron J.A. in Red Eye 3. So, far from representing appellate
court endorsement of the position that a provincial human rights law which prohibited
conduct which “ridiculed, belittled or…affronted the dignity” of an identified group
can be reconciled with the right to free expression in s.2(b) of the Charter, the clear
implication of the decision of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in Bell is to the
contrary—only if this portion of s.14 is read down so as to be of no practical effect
can it be saved from constitutional invalidity.
Having settled the constitutional validity issue, the Court of Appeal ruled that
there was “ample evidence” to support a finding that the stickers violated s.14, even
with the heightened threshold achieved by the judicially added ‘discriminatory effect’
requirement :
The stickers, by their use of strong images, rather then words,
appeal to emotion as much as to reason and their purpose and effect
is unmistakable: they expose or tend to expose those groups
represented by the images to all of the things which constitute
235 Sherstobitoff J.A. conceded that the Court’s reasons for this conclusion were “rather perfunctory

…”(ibid. at 382).
236 Bell 2, supra note 220 at 378 [Emphasis added].

63

hatred as here defined. They do this by showing the groups depicted
to the viewer as being different from the other members of society
in a malevolent way, attributing to them undesirable characteristics
such as dangerousness, untrustworthiness, lack of cleanliness, lack
of emotion, inferior intelligence, dishonesty and deceit.… And all
of this is reinforced and driven home by the circle and slash
superimposed over the image, the universal symbol for forbidden,
not allowed or not wanted.…
As to the second part of the third element, that the display of the
stickers caused or tended to cause others to engage in
discriminatory practices in contravention of Part II of the Code, the
inescapable inference is that was both the purpose and effect of any
display of the stickers.… Bell, by displaying them for sale and
selling them, provided those who might be inclined to act in
contravention of Part II the means to do so. For example, a
businessman at his place of business, or a provider of public
accommodation at the premises that he had to let, by posting the
sticker or stickers at the entrance would make it clear that any
goods, services or amenities provided would not be made available
to the groups depicted, or at least that their trade was not wanted.237
Finally, the Court ruled that the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench had erred in
denying standing to the Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission, and issued an
injunction restraining Bell from selling or distributing all three of the stickers.238
Sherstobitoff J.A.’s choice of hypothetical scenario to demonstrate the likely
effect of the stickers sold by Bell can be regarded as emblematic of the Court of
Appeal’s restrictive approach to the interpretation of Saskatchewan’s hate speech law,
not only in Bell, but also in the earlier Red Eye 3. The scenario is, in essence, a version
of the classic ‘whites only’ sign which was the motivation for Canada’s original, and
unquestionably narrow, provincial human rights law hate speech prohibition—
Ontario’s Racial Discrimination Act 1944 (discussed above in Part 3.1). And yet it is
clear that the Saskatchewan legislature, by enacting s.14 of the Saskatchewan Human
Rights Code in 1979, and by further expanding its scope in 1989, intended to prohibit
a broader range of forms of harmful communication than was covered by the
traditional discriminatory signs and symbols formulation, in order to provide enhanced
protection to victims of hate speech and to set a higher community standard of
acceptable public behaviour. However, such was its concern for limiting the threat
posed by s.14 to free speech imperatives, the Court of Appeal felt compelled to reign

237 Ibid. at 379-380.
238 Ibid. at 384.
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in the prohibition by reading down the harm component of the definition so to always
require evidence that the communication in question carried with it the likelihood that
the target group will be subjected to unlawful discrimination.
This tendency for free speech sensitivity to be manifested, not in successful
challenges to the constitutional validity of legislation, but in the adoption of restrictive
interpretations of the scope of hate speech prohibitions, is not exclusive to
Saskatchewan. As will be demonstrated below, it can also be observed in a number of
decisions handed down by tribunals and courts in other provinces. However,
this tendency towards narrow construction is not universal, as the most recent case to
come before a Saskatchewan Board of Inquiry demonstrates.

Sexual Orientation: Hellquist, Roy and Dodds v. Owens and Sterling Newspapers
Company operating as the Star Phoenix 239
Hugh Owens placed an advertisement in the June 30th, 1997 issue of the Saskatoon
Star Phoenix newspaper that “consisted of four passages from the Bible in red ink,
followed by an equal sign and two stick men holding hands inside a red circle with a
line through the stick men.” 240
The Saskatchewan Human Rights Board of Inquiry found that the combined
effect of the “universal symbol for forbidden”241 and the bible passages which are
commonly cited as evidence of the wrongfulness of homosexuality and as justification
for punishment or persecution of gays and lesbians was such that the advertisement
breached s.14(1):
It is clear that the advertisement is intended to make the group
depicted appear to be inferior or not wanted at best. When
combined with the biblical quotations, the advertisement may result
in a far stronger meaning. It is obvious that certain of the biblical
quotations suggest more dire consequences and there can be no
question that the advertisement can objectively be seen as exposing
homosexuals to hatred or ridicule.242
Notably, although the Board of Inquiry summarised the elements of s.14 with
reference to the Court of Appeal decision in Bell (including the ‘additional’
239 (2001), 40 C.H.R.R. D/197 (Sask. Bd. Inq.) [Star Phoenix].
240 Ibid. at D/197.
241 Ibid. at D/200.
242 Ibid.
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requirement of likely discriminatory effect), when it turned to the facts at hand, and
the merits of the case, there was no mention of this requirement. The Board’s
conclusion that the advertisement breached s.14(1) appeared to be based simply on its
finding that the contents of the advertisement “would expose or tend to expose
homosexuals to hatred or ridicule”.243
The Board was also called upon to consider the effect of the standard free
speech rider in s.14(2).244 However, it simply quoted from and relied on the authority
of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal decision in Bell to find that s.14(1) of the Code
was a reasonable restriction on Owens’ right to freedom of expression. The Board
prohibited Sterling Newspapers from accepting the advertisement for publication in
the future and ordered that it pay each complainant $1,500 in damages. The Board
prohibited Owens from displaying the advertisement contents in any medium and
ordered that he also pay each of the complainants $1,500 in damages.
An appeal by Owens to the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench was
unsuccessful,245 Barclay J. confirming both the correctness of the Board’s finding of
fact, and its ruling as to the constitutionality of s.14(1). At the time of writing, an
appeal to the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal was pending.
4.2.3 British Columbia

In 1993, the prohibition on discriminatory signs and symbols in s.2 of the Human
Rights Act 1984 was replaced with a broader hate speech provision. The prohibition is
now found in Section 7 of the British Columbia Human Rights Code 1996246:
A person must not publish, issue or display or cause to be published,
issued or displayed any statement, publication, notice, sign, symbol,
emblem or other representation that
(a) indicates discrimination or an intention to discriminate against a
person or a group or class of persons,
(b) is likely to expose a person or a group or class of persons to hatred
or contempt

243 Ibid.
244 Section 14(2) of the Saskatchewan Human Rights Code 1979 (supra note 194) provides that:

“Nothing in subsection (1) restricts the right to freedom of speech under the law upon any subject.”
245 Hellquist v. Owens, 2002 SKQB 506, 45 C.H.R.R. D/272.
246 R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 240.
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because of the race, colour ancestry, place of origin, religion, marital
status, family status, physical or mental disability, sex, sexual
orientation or age of that person or that group or class of persons.
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to a private communication or to a
communication intended to be private.
The amendment generated considerable controversy.247 In addition to vigorous
debate in the legislature,248 enactment of the legislation was greeted with strong media
criticism. The targets of criticism were numerous, including British Columbia’s New
Democratic Party government, the British Columbia Human Rights Commission,
human rights tribunals generally, and the very notion of ‘human rights’ law (as well as
the Supreme Court of Canada). The legislation was described in a Globe and Mail
editorial as an example of human rights law “being twisted, distorted and stood on its
head in a bid to...stifle free speech.”249
One of the specific criticisms directed at the new provisions was that the hate
speech prohibition was not accompanied by the standard sub-section two free speech
rider. Notwithstanding considerable support for the view that the rider was superfluous
(see above), its absence from British Columbia’s new hate speech legislation was
seized upon as evidence that the legislature had paid insufficient attention to the right
to free speech. However, if opponents of the legislation were seriously worried that the
absence of a rider would place free speech arguments off limits when it came time to
adjudicate on alleged breaches of the legislative prohibition their concerns were very
much unfounded. Even in the absence of the standard subsection two rider, the task of
negotiating the balance between protecting free speech and sanctioning hate speech
has dominated the deliberations of the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal in
those cases in which it has been called upon to adjudicate on an alleged breach of s.7
of the British Columbia Human Rights Code 1996.
Canadian Jewish Congress v. North Shore Free Press and Collins250

247 See e.g., R. Matas, “Hate-law changes to proceed in B.C.: Concern raised about rights”, The Globe

and Mail (16 June 1993) A4.
248 See, e.g., British Columbia, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of the Debates of the Legislative

Assembly (Hansard), 11(6) (16 June 1993) at, 7338f; 11(7) (17 June 1993) at 7371f.
249 Editorial, “A criminal abuse of human rights” The Globe and Mail (19 June 1993), D6.
250 (1997) 30 C.H.R.R. D/5 [CJC].

67

In 1994 the Canadian Jewish Congress lodged a complaint with the (then) British
Columbia Council of Human Rights alleging a contravention of s.2 of the Human
Rights Act 1984251. The complaint related to an opinion column published in a
Vancouver community newspaper, the North Shore News on March 9th, 1994. The
author (Doug Collins) and the publisher (North Shore Free Press Ltd.) were named as
respondents. The complaint was not formally heard until May 1997. In the interim
the Human Rights Act 1984 had been replaced by the Human Rights Code 1996 and
the Council of Human Rights had been replaced by the British Columbia Human
Rights Commission and the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal. Therefore the
complaint was treated when it came before the Human Rights Tribunal as a complaint
under s.7 of the 1996 Code that superseded (but was identical to) s.2 of the earlier
legislation.
The complainant claimed that the article published in the North Shore News on
March 9th was likely to expose Jewish people to hatred or contempt on the basis of
their race, religion or ancestry, and therefore, was in contravention of s.7(1)(b). In the
newspaper column Collins expressed the opinion that the Steven Spielberg film
“Schindler’s List” would “run away with the Academy Awards”, not because it was
deserving of the honour, but because “the Jewish influence is the most powerful in
Hollywood” and “what happened to the Jews during the Second World War is not only
the longest lasting but also the most effective propaganda exercise ever.”252 Referring
to the number of Jews killed during the Holocaust, Collins described the commonly
cited figure of six million as “nonsense”. He suggested that far too much attention was
paid to the Jewish Holocaust: “There have been many holocausts but most of them
have hardly warranted a paragraph, let alone movies.”253
Free speech considerations had an explicit and immediate effect on the
proceedings in CJC. Before addressing the merits of the complaint the Tribunal was
asked to rule on the constitutional validity of s.7(1)(b) of the Code. In addition to
arguing that the section was ultra vires because it was a criminal law which
“trenche[d] on federal criminal law jurisdiction under s.91(27) of the Constitution Act,
1867”254 (an argument which the Tribunal rejected255), the respondents argued that

251 R.S.B.C. 1984, c. 22.
252 CJC, supra note 250, at D/49.
253 Ibid.
254 Ibid. at para. 34.
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“speech”, and specifically, “political speech” was a subject of exclusive federal
jurisdiction. The Tribunal considered that the only possible basis upon which this
contention could be supported was the “implied bill of rights doctrine” which “asserts
that certain very fundamental rights, freedom of political speech in particular, cannot
be abridged by either level of government.”256 However, the current status of this
doctrine in the courts was unclear. In any event, the Tribunal concluded that hate
speech could not be protected by the doctrine because, following Dickson C.J. in R v.
Keegstra,257 it is “‘inimical’ to the workings of democracy”,258 the facilitation of
which constitutes the rationale for the idea of special protection for political speech.
The primary free speech objection advanced by the respondents was that
s.7(1)(b) of the BC Human Rights Code was invalid by virtue of inconsistency with
s.2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Section 2 provides, inter alia,
that “[e]veryone has the following fundamental freedoms: (b) freedom of thought,
belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of
communication”. From the outset, it was not disputed that s.7(1)(b) of the BC Human
Rights Code did infringe freedom of expression in s.2(b) of the Charter. Debate
focused on whether or not s.7(1)(b) was nonetheless valid by virtue of s.1 of the
Charter.259
For the Tribunal then, the task was to interpret s.7(1)(b) in light of the Charter,
and to determine whether the section was a reasonable limit, using the test endorsed by
the Supreme Court of Canada in R v. Oakes.260 The fact that the provision was
contained in remedial human rights legislation was relevant. Such legislation is
generally “consonant with the Charter’s guarantees rather than antagonistic to
them”261 so that “decision-makers should take particular care when interpreting a
human rights provision in light of the Charter to give the provision its fullest possible
effect short of overshooting constitutional limits.”262 The examination required by s.1
of the Charter involves a balancing of the “constitutional values furthered by the
255 Ibid. at para. 56.
256 Ibid. at para. 65. See Ontario Public Service Employees’ Union v. Ontario, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 2,
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legislative provision against the right or rights infringed...”263 Context is central to this
analysis, and in the present case consideration was given to “the anti-Semitism
context, the media context, and the [local] community context.”264
The Tribunal concluded that the infringement of free speech caused by
s.7(1)(b) of the BC Human Rights Code was constitutionally valid:
Accepting that s.7(1)(b) of the Code infringes the guarantee of freedom
of expression in s.2(b) of the Charter, I find that the objective of the
measure is pressing and substantial, and that the measure itself is
proportional to the objective.… It is rationally connected to the
legislative objective in that it is not arbitrary, or irrational, nor does it
overreach the justifiable limits of the objective. Further, it is minimally
impairing of freedom of expression in that there appears to be no
alternative measure that is both significantly less intrusive of freedom
of expression and equally effective to attain the legislative objective of
s.7(1)(b). Finally, considering the likely impact of the provision, I find
that its deleterious impact on freedom of expression is outweighed both
by its objective and by its salutary effects. In sum, s.7(1)(b) of the Code
is a reasonable limit on freedom of expression that is demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society. It is constitutionally valid.265
This conclusion rested on the Tribunal’s preference for a narrow reading of the
scope of the s.7(1)(b) prohibition (see below). Significantly, the Tribunal observed that
“…a broader interpretation of the reach of s.7(1)(b) would not be constitutionally
supportable.”266 In this respect, the decision of the British Columbia Human Rights
Tribunal in CJC provides an unequivocal illustration of the way in which a concern for
minimising the detriment caused to the right to free speech has resulted in relatively
narrow interpretations of the scope of legislative restrictions on hate speech. The case
illustrates that there is a very important nexus between the question of constitutional
validity and the question of the breadth of provincial prohibitions on hate speech. In
CJC, resolution of the constitutional validity question did not exhaust the impact of
free speech sensitivity on the decision of the BC Human Rights Tribunal. The
Tribunal’s interpretation of the scope of s.7(1)(b) was very clearly influenced by what
the Tribunal regarded as the need to interpret the prohibition in light of the Charter
(and the right to freedom of expression in particular). This influence was manifested in
two ways.

263 Ibid. at para. 86.
264 Ibid at para. 88.
265 Ibid. at para. 243.
266 Ibid. at para. 244.
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First, the Charter was, unsurprisingly, a factor in the Tribunal’s interpretation
of the phrase “hatred or contempt” as establishing a high harm threshold (“unusually
strong and deeply-felt emotions of detestation, calumny and vilification”267),
consistent with the interpretation of the same phrase268 by the Supreme Court of
Canada in Taylor.269 The Tribunal quoted a passage from the decision of Dickson C.J.
in that case in which the Chief Justice endorsed an interpretation of similar federal
legislation which ensured that it “extend[ed] only to that expression giving rise to the
evil sought to be eradicated and provides a standard of conduct sufficiently precise to
prevent the unacceptable chilling of expressive activity.”270
Second, and more controversially, free speech sensitivity led the Tribunal to
rule that determining whether there had been a breach of s.7(1)(b) involved a two part
test:
First, does the communication itself express hatred or contempt of a
person or group on the basis of one or more of the listed grounds?
Would a reasonable person understand this message as expressing
hatred or contempt in the context of the expression?
Second, assessed in its context, is the likely effect of the
communication to make it more acceptable for others to manifest hatred
or contempt against the person or group concerned? Would a
reasonable person consider it likely to increase the risk of exposure of
target group members to hatred or contempt?271
On the face of it, there is nothing about the wording of s.7(1)(b) which
suggests that it is necessary to determine whether the conduct in question expresses
hatred or contempt before turning to assess the likely effect of that conduct. The first
limb of the test clearly narrows the scope of the prohibition and makes it more difficult
for a complainant to establish that the legislative standard has been breached. The
Tribunal expressly identified concerns for limiting the impact of the legislative
restriction on free speech as the motivation for this interpretation:
The first requirement flows from an appreciation of the constraints on
restriction on freedom of expression imposed by the Charter. In my
view, the section would be too chilling of fair commentary on sensitive

267 Ibid. at para. 121.
268 As it appears in s. 13(1) of the Canadian Human Rights Act 1977 (supra note 2).
269Supra note 4.
270 CJC, supra note 250 at para. 121.
271 Ibid. at para. 245.
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and controversial issues if a message that was not hateful or
contemptuous in itself could be caught by this prohibition.272
It is questionable whether there is a meaningful distinction between whether
conduct is hateful or contemptuous “in itself”, and in its effect (unless the former
inquiry involves an assessment of the respondent’s intention or motivation when
engaging in the conduct—a restrictive approach which there is no indication that the
Tribunal intended to adopt).
Turning to the newspaper article in question, the Tribunal held that the article
was clearly anti-Semitic:
Reading the article itself, even without the benefit of evidence on its
meaning, I have no hesitation in finding that it is anti-Semitic. It says,
either directly or by clear implication that films like Schindler’s List are
hate propaganda by Jews against Germans; that the generally accepted
figure of six million Jewish victims of the Holocaust is grossly inflated
and the Holocaust is no different from other wartime mass killings; that
the popularity of the film and its likely success in the Academy Awards
is a product of Jewish control of Hollywood. I find that a reasonable
person would understand this to be the meaning of the column. I further
find that a reasonable person would consider the column to be antiSemitic, offensive and hurtful to Jewish people.273
However, the Tribunal held that the mere fact that the article was anti-Semitic
did not necessarily mean that it contravened s.7. When the first limb of the test was
applied, the Tribunal concluded that although the tone of the article was nasty,
deliberately provocative and insulting, it “does not capture the degree of calumny,
detestation or vilification signified by ‘hatred or contempt’ as the phrase is used in
s.7(1)(b)”.274
The impact of the heightened threshold created by the two-limb test was
vividly illustrated by the Tribunal’s conclusion that although the article did not express
hatred or contempt of Jews, it’s publication was (as per the second limb of the test)
likely to have the effect of increasing the risk that Jews would be exposed to hatred or
contempt. However, as the Tribunal had decided that both limbs of the test needed to
be established in order to place the article within the definition of the legislative
prohibition, the complaint was dismissed.

272 Ibid. at para. 131.
273 Ibid. at para. 249.
274 Ibid. at para. 252.
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Abrams v. North Shore Free Press and Collins275

Doug Collins’ opinion pieces in the North Shore News were the subject of a separate
complaint lodged by Harry Abrams in 1994. Whereas the complaint in CJC had been
lodged in relation to a single newspaper column, the complaint in Abrams was lodged
in relation to four columns that appeared between January and June 1994.276
The matter was heard in two parts. A decision on the merits—that is, whether
there had been a breach of s.7(1) of the British Columbia Human Rights Code 1996—
was handed down in 1999. A decision on the constitutional validity of s.7(1) was
handed down in 2001, in response to an argument that that the provision infringed the
right to freedom of expression in s.2(b) of the Charter and could not be saved by s.1.
The merits inquiry focused on s.7(1)(b) of the Code, the complainant having
withdrawn his original contention that the publications also breached s.7(1)(a). The
Tribunal began its analysis by considering whether the interpretation of s.7(1)(b) by a
differently constituted Tribunal in CJC was correct. Specifically, the Tribunal
considered the respondent’s argument that in CJC the Tribunal had inappropriately
read down the scope of the prohibition contained in s.7(1)(b) so as to ensure that the
provision was compatible with the Charter. The respondent’s argument focused on the
first part of the two-part test endorsed in CJC—that is, asking “whether a reasonable
person would understand the message as expressing hatred or contempt”:277
The Respondents submit that this part of the test limits the
application of the section, and that the Tribunal adopted this part of
the test explicitly to reduce the risk that the section may infringe the
Charter. They submit that there is nothing in the legislation that
limits the application of the section to messages that express hatred
or contempt. The Tribunal, therefore, intruded into the function of
the legislature.…
In essence, the Respondents’ position is that the interpretation
adopted in the CJC case…set a higher threshold than the
Legislature intended.278
The Tribunal in Abrams noted that this might seem a counterproductive
argument for a respondent to advance (given that if successful, it might increase the
275 (1999) 33 C.H.R.R. D/435 [Abrams].
276 Ibid. at para. 5. Abrams applied to have his complaint heard with the CJC complaint, but the

respondents opposed this application and the Tribunal refused to allow it.
277 Abrams, supra note 275 at para. 31.
278 Ibid. at para. 32-33.

73

chance that the conduct in question would be considered to fall within the enlarged
scope of the prohibition), but recognised that it was likely that this strategy was
designed to increase the size of the ‘target’ for the respondent’s constitutional
challenge to s.7 of the Human Rights Code.
The Tribunal in Abrams concluded that the two part test adopted previously by
the Tribunal in CJC did not involve an inappropriate reading down of s.7(1)(b).
Although “the Charter played an important role in the development of the two-part
test”279, the interpretation preferred in CJC was “a reasonable one considering the
language and purposes of the Code.”280
It did not follow, however, that the Tribunal in Abrams was obliged to apply
the interpretation of s.7(1)(b) which had been endorsed in CJC, as “an administrative
tribunal is not bound by its prior decisions”.281 While recognising the desirability of
consistent application of the law, the Tribunal did “not think the interests of justice
would be served by rigidly applying a test that was developed after so little experience
with the legislation.”282 Nonetheless, the Tribunal member concluded that “for the
purpose of this case, I intend to use this two-part test as the framework for my
analysis,”283 satisfied that it “encompasses, with some modifications, those
considerations which I consider to be necessary in determining whether a publication
contravenes s.7(1)(b).”284
Consistent with the decision in CJC, the Tribunal observed that the mere fact
that a message was ‘anti-Semitic’ did not necessarily mean that it exposed Jews to
hatred or contempt for the purpose of s.7(1)(b) of the Code:

It is necessary to go behind the label and inquire into the nature of
the anti-Semitic speech.
In this case, the columns contain themes that reinforce some of the
most virulent forms of anti-Semitism. They convey notions that
Jews conspire to manipulate society’s most important institutions
for their own gain; and that, through control of the media, they have
279 Ibid. at para. 37.
280 Ibid. at para. 39.
281 Ibid. at para. 41.
282 Ibid. at para. 46.
283 Ibid. at para. 47.
284 Ibid. The tone of the Tribunal’s discussion of this issue suggests that it had some sympathy for the
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perpetrated a massive fraud to exaggerate their suffering during the
Holocaust. The Jews are portrayed as selfish, greedy and
manipulative.…
In my opinion, collectively, and through repetition of anti-Semitic
themes, the columns take on a vicious tone that taps into a
centuries-old pattern of persecution and slander of Jews. They
perpetuate the most damaging stereotypes of Jews.285
The Tribunal concluded that, collectively, the columns written by Collins and
published in the North Shore News would be regarded by a reasonable person as
expressing hatred and contempt (first step of test) and “likely to make it more
acceptable for others to manifest hatred or contempt against Jewish people”286 (second
step). It followed that the publication of the columns was contrary to the prohibition
contained in s.7(1)(b) of the Code and that the complaint should be upheld. The
Tribunal ordered the respondents to “cease publishing statements that expose or are
likely to expose Jewish persons to hatred or contempt and to refrain from committing
the same or a similar contravention,”287 pay the complainant $2,000 in damages, and
publish a summary of the Tribunal’s decision in the North Shore News.
In April 1999 Doug Collins sought judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision in
the Supreme Court of British Columbia and also applied to have the outstanding
question of the constitutional validity of s.7(1)(b) determined in that court rather than
the Tribunal. These applications were unsuccessful and Quijano J. ordered that the
case be referred back to the Tribunal.288 On appeal the British Columbia Court of
Appeal confirmed that the BC Human Rights Tribunal did have jurisdiction to
adjudicate on the constitutional questions raised by the case, and that the decision to
remit was correct.289
The constitutional challenge to s.7(1) was heard by the Tribunal in 2001, with
a decision handed down in November of that year.290 The Tribunal endorsed the
analysis and conclusion of the earlier decision in CJC: s.7(1)(b) of the Code does

285 Abrams, supra note 274 at para. 68-70.
286 Ibid. at para. 83.
287 Ibid. at para. 87.
288 Collins v. Abrams (1999), 19 Admin L.R. (3d) 269, [1999] B.C.J. No 2859 (BCSC) (QL).
289 Collins v. Abrams (2001), 196 D.L.R. (4th) 570, 2001 BCCA 22.
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infringe s.2(b) of the Charter, but “it is demonstrably justifiable in a free and
democratic society and is therefore constitutionally valid.” 291
Stacey v. Campbell and Choose Life Canada292

In 1998 Kevin Stacey lodged a complaint with the British Columbia Human Rights
Commission alleging that an advertisement which had been placed in the Globe and
Mail by Kenneth Campbell and Choose Life Canada breached s.7(1)(a) of the Human
Rights Code 1996. The advertisement, under the headline “CANADA’S SUPREME
COURT HAS NO BUSINESS IMPOSING ‘BATHHOUSE MORALITY’ ON THE
CHURCHES AND IN THE NATION’S LIVING ROOMS!”, was essentially a
criticism of a recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada which had held that
Alberta’s human rights legislation was contrary to s.15 of the Charter because it failed
to include sexual orientation as one of the recognised grounds of unlawful
discrimination.293 The advertisement contained a number of negative statements
regarding homosexuality focusing on sexual conduct, with references to “buggery”
and sodomy”, and included a “Manifesto of Hope” which, in the words of the Tribunal
…indicates opposition to same-sex marriage and parentage,
recommends a prohibition on the ability of homosexual youth
support organisations from disseminating certain information in the
schools, and urges government agencies to register, treat and
monitor every individual with HIV, Hepatitis-C or AIDS.294
Before the Tribunal, Stacey applied to amend his complaint to include an
allegation that the advertisement also infringed s.7(1)(b) in that it exposed gays and
lesbians to hatred or contempt. The Tribunal refused this request on the basis that it
would be prejudicial to the respondent. This procedural decision turned out to be

291 Ibid. at para. 37. Collins’ wife, on behalf of her husband’s estate, applied for judicial review of the
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critical to the outcome of the case. The essence of the complainant’s case was that the
advertisement was “hateful and offensive.”295 The Tribunal rejected the complainant’s
argument that the “hateful communications [covered by s.7(1)(b)] are a subset of the
discrimination prohibited by s.7(1)(a).”296 Consequently, the complainant was forced
to couch his submissions in such a way as to establish a breach of s.7(1)(a) (“indicates
discrimination or an intention to discriminate”) rather than a breach of s.7(1)(b)
(“likely to expose to hatred or contempt”).
Stacey failed to persuade the Tribunal that the advertisement indicated
discrimination or an intention to discriminate. In reaching this conclusion the Tribunal
relied on a surprisingly narrow interpretation of the scope of s.7(1)(a), and a high
evidentiary threshold in terms of evidence of discrimination. On the first issue the
Tribunal interpreted s.7(1)(a) as requiring evidence that the communication “indicates
discrimination or an intention to discriminate with respect to the fields of activity that
are covered by the other sections of the Code,”297 even though there is no such
limitation expressed in the legislation, and the British Columbia legislature had
removed such a limiting phrase298 in 1993 when it expanded the narrow
discriminatory signs and symbols prohibition and replaced it with a broader hate
speech prohibition.
The Tribunal also purported to find support for this approach in the
interpretation of equivalent legislation in Sambo’s Pepperpot299 and Red Eye300
(Saskatchewan), Bramhill301 (Nova Scotia), and Kane 4302 (Alberta). However, this
marshalling of authority is unconvincing because in actual fact, in each of these cases,
the adjudicatory body adopted a relatively broad interpretation of the phrase “indicates
discrimination” and certainly could not be regarded as having endorsed or employed a
reading down of the scope of the phrase “indicates discrimination” as the Tribunal in
Stacey suggested.303

295 Ibid. at para. 50.
296 Ibid. at para. 24.
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The Tribunal commented on the failure of the complainants to introduce
sufficient evidence “that the advertisement had an adverse effect, or likely effect, on
the basis of sexual orientation in any of the fields of activities covered by the
Code.”304 Even in the absence of expert testimony305 it is hard to see how the Tribunal
could fail to be satisfied that the advertisement’s perpetuation of negative stereotypes
of gays and lesbians could, for example, fortify the resolve of some employers in
British Columbia to discriminate against gays and lesbians—just as the Saskatchewan
Board of Inquiry in Sambo’s Pepperpot was satisfied that signs and symbols that
perpetuated negative stereotypes of African Canadians could increase the risk that they
would be subjected to discrimination in the field of employment.
It was somewhat disingenuous for the Tribunal hold out this approach as
consistent with previous interpretations of equivalent prohibitions in other provincial
human rights statutes. It would have been preferable for the Tribunal to have
articulated more fully the reasons for a narrow reading of the scope of s.7(1)(a). It is
possible that one of the factors was that, given that the legislature had, in 1993,
expanded the scope of the prohibition to include conduct which was likely to expose to
hatred or contempt (that is, the current s.7(1)(b)), the Tribunal did not feel any
pressure to broadly interpret the “indicates discrimination” phrase—pressure of the
sort which some previous adjudicators appear to have felt in the absence of any
alternative mechanisms for sanctioning objectionable material.306 Less speculatively,
it is clear that concern for the impact of the s.7(1)(a) prohibition on the right to
freedom of expression under s.2(b) of the Charter and the right to freedom of religion
under s.2(a) of the Charter was a significant influence on the relatively narrow
interpretation of the scope of s.7(1)(a) preferred by the Tribunal:

discrimination. If anything then, these decisions might be regarded as having ‘stretched’ the parameters
of the discriminatory signs and symbols prohibition rather then as having read it down. In addition, the
Tribunal in Stacey (supra note 292) did not acknowledge the decision in Kane (supra note 91), in
which the Alberta Board of Inquiry had expressly concluded that the phrase “indicates discrimination”
should not be read down in this way.
304 Stacy, supra note 292 at para. 50.
305 Ibid.
306 It is likely that, even on a conservative interpretation of the scope of s.7(1)(b) (such as the two-part
test adopted by the Tribunal in Abrams v. North Shore Free Press and Collins (supra note 275)) that
the advertisement in question violated the prohibition on communications likely to expose individuals
or groups to hatred or contempt. The Tribunal was at pains to make clear that it had not made any
ruling on this issue, and that it decision in this case should “not…be read as a determination that the
advertisement, or others like it, are permitted under the Code: Stacey, supra note 292 at para. 56.
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On its face, broader interpretations than the one I have advanced are
possible. The provision could be interpreted so as to prohibit
publications of all statements that indicate discrimination or an
intention to discriminate on any of the prohibited grounds, whether
or not the discrimination itself would contravene the Code.…
However, in my opinion, such an interpretation would have a more
severe impact on the Respondents’ freedom of expression and
religion than the interpretation I have proposed.307
Analysis of the three hate speech decisions handed down by the British
Columbia Human Rights Tribunal since 1996 supports the central argument advanced
in this article regarding the impact in which free speech sensitivity has impacted on the
operation of provincial hate speech laws. Free speech sensitivity has not supported
findings that s.7 of the Human Rights Code 1996 is constitutionally invalid, but it has
prompted the Tribunal to narrowly construct the parameters of the prohibition on hate
speech. In two of the three cases (CJC, Stacey) this tendency was instrumental in the
Tribunal’s decision to dismiss the complaints on the basis that the conduct in question
did not satisfy the elevated threshold.
The British Columbia experience reminds us that even where hate speech
legislation successfully negotiates the hurdle of constitutional challenge, it may still
provide only limited protection to victims. Indeed, diminished protection may be the
price that is paid for ensuring constitutional validity.
4.2.4 Alberta

In 1996 the Alberta Individual’s Rights Protection Act was overhauled and renamed
the Human Rights, Citizenship and Multiculturalism Act. The prohibition on
discriminatory signs and symbols in s.2 of the old Act was repealed and replaced with
a broader prohibition on hate speech along the lines of the 1993 amendments in British
Columbia. It is now found in s.3 of the Human Rights, Citizenship and
Multiculturalism Act:308
(1) No person shall publish, issue or display or cause to be published,
issued or displayed before the public any statement, publication, notice,
sign, symbol, emblem or other representation that

307 Stacey, supra note 292 at para. 37.
308 R.S.A. 2000, c. H-14.
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(a) indicates discrimination or an intention to discriminate
against a person or class of persons, or
(b) is likely to expose a person or a class of persons to hatred or
contempt
because of the race, religious beliefs, colour, gender, physical
disability, mental disability, age, ancestry, place of origin, marital
status, source of income or family status of that person or class of
persons.
(2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to interfere with the free
expression of opinion on any subject.
The expansion of the traditional discriminatory signs and symbols prohibition
was one of the recommendations of the Alberta Human Rights Review Panel
contained in the 1994 report, Equal in Dignity and Rights: a Review of Human Rights
in Alberta.309 The Review Panel noted in its report that “[m]any submissions to the
Review indicated that Section 2 of the [Individual’s Rights Protection] Act is not broad
enough and that other media have been used to spread hatred against particular
groups.”310 The Review Panel recommended that “the IPRA should be amended to
include other public media of communication and that subsection 2(2) be kept as a
safeguard of free expression.”311
Section 3 of the Human Rights, Citizenship and Multiculturalism Act certainly
broadens the prohibition in the manner proposed by the Review Panel by applying to a
broad range of forms of communication. However, the current formulation of
Alberta’s hate speech prohibition also expands the traditional discriminatory signs and
symbols prohibition in a manner not specifically addressed by the Review: the
prohibition applies not only to conduct which indicates discrimination, but also to
conduct which is likely to expose an identified group to hatred or contempt.
The records of legislative debate provide no guidance as to why the
Progressive-Conservative Government under Premier Ralph Klein chose to effect this
reform. In the second reading speech by the Minister of Community Development,
Gary Mar, no mention was made of the amendments to the hate speech provisions.312
In fact, while several aspects of the amending legislation (Bill 24) were the subject of
309 Alberta, Alberta Human Rights Review Panel, Equal in Dignity and Rights: A Review of Human
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criticism and heated debate in the legislature, no government or opposition member
made mention of the expansion of the prohibition to cover the promotion of hatred
and contempt, in addition to the promotion of discrimination.
While the precise motivation for this reform is difficult to detect, analysis of
the records of parliamentary debate on Bill 24 does reveal concerns that the province
of Alberta has an unwanted reputation for racial intolerance, and suggests that these
concerns played a role in the strengthening and expansion of the existing legislation.
For example, Liberal MLA Gary Dickson encouraged any members of the Legislative
Assembly who might be of the view that “‘this is Alberta; we don’t have a problem
here when it comes to tolerance and discrimination’“313 to read Warren Kinsella’s
Web of Hate314 which “documents the role and rise of Aryan Nations by white
supremacist groups in this province”.315 Mr Dickson also noted that:
This is the province where Jim Keegstra was able to practise his
particular brand of intolerance and bigotry for 10 years. We still have
taxicabs in the city of Calgary that will be dispatched with all white
drivers if the caller requests a Caucasian driver.316
In her contribution to the debate on Bill 24 Progressive-Conservative MLA,
Yvonne Fritz referred to survey data which revealed that “a significant number of
Albertans still hold negative attitudes about people from different cultures and
backgrounds”.317
Cross-party endorsement of such sentiments may explain why there was no
expression of concern in the legislature about the reforms’ implications for free
speech, even though the 1996 amendments to Alberta’s human rights statute were
almost identical to those which had generated such heated debate when introduced in
British Columbia three year earlier. It is also likely that the inclusion of the standard
subsection two free speech rider served to mitigate concerns about infringing the right
to free speech, even though the effect of the provision is generally regarded as being
mainly symbolic.

313 Ibid. at 1230,
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Since the 1996 amendments there have been two decisions by the Alberta
Human Rights Panel in relation to alleged violations of s.3 of the Human Rights,
Citizenship and Multiculturalism Act.

Re Kane 318

On 31 October 1997 an article appeared in Alberta Report magazine entitled “A
Canmore Mall Project Ends in a Bitter Feud”. The article addressed events that had
occurred during the negotiations between a Canadian builder, Fred Schickedanz, and
an American promoter, Benson Flanzbaum, associated with a failed commercial
property development. The article included references to the amount of gold jewellery
worn by Mr. Flanzbaum as well as to his “open shirts” and “hirsute chest.” The article
also contained the following passage:
One professional planner comments on the failed project: ‘North
American commercial real estate is dominated by firms that often
happen to be Jewish owned [e.g. Oshawa and Canmore Development].
The retail sector is much the same. Like cliques everywhere, some of
these people tend to deal with each other, and Mr. Schickedanz is an
outsider.’319
A complaint was lodged with the Alberta Human Rights and Citizenship
Commission by the Jewish Defense League of Canada and Harvey Kane on May 4th,
1998, alleging that the publication of the article contravened (what was then) s.2 of the
Human Rights, Citizenship and Multiculturalism Act 1980320 (now s.3 of the Human
Rights, Citizenship and Multiculturalism Act 2000). After attempts to resolve the
complaint by conciliation failed, the complaint was dismissed. This decision was
appealed and the matter was referred to the Alberta Human Rights and Citizenship
Commission Panel for determination. Before determining the merits of the complaint
the Panel submitted a number of questions of law to the Alberta Court of Queen’s
Bench for an opinion. The opinion was handed down by Rooke J. on June 29th, 2001.

The questions relevant to the issues being explored in this paper were:

318 2001 A.B.Q.B. 570 [Kane 3].
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3. Can a breach of section 2(1) of the Act be found in the face of a
defence based on section 2(2)? That is, does section 2(2) bar the Panel
from finding a breach of 2(1) when the alleged wrongdoer can establish
that he/she is freely expressing his/her opinion?
4. If section 2(2) is not a bar to finding a breach of section 2(1), can
section 2(2) be used after a finding of breach of section 2(1) in order to
justify that breach?
5. What standards must the Panel apply to determine whether a
representation “is likely to expose a person or a class of persons to
hatred or contempt”? Are different considerations applied to questions
of “contempt” as opposed to questions of “hatred”?321
In relation to the significance of s.2(2) of the Act (i.e. questions 3 and 4) Rooke
J. opined that s.2(2) provides neither a defence nor a justification for a breach of
s.2(1). He observed that several cases have established that protection from hate or
contempt-based expression “is a pressing and substantial objective, and is justified in a
free and democratic society.”322 If the protection afforded by legislative restrictions on
hate speech could simply be over-ridden by allowing a respondent to place his or her
conduct outside the scope of the prohibition by showing that he or she was just
expressing an opinion, the rights would be meaningless and defeat the purpose of the
legislation. Justice Rooke noted that “excluding opinions from the reach of s.2(1)
would go a long way in defeating the purpose of the legislation.”323
According to Rooke J., although s.2(2) does not create a defence, it does
require that in the interpretation and application of s.2(1) freedom of expression must
be balanced against the objective of eliminating discrimination.324 This involves a
two-step process. First, the terms “hatred” and “contempt” must be interpreted with an
awareness of the need to achieve this balance—ensuring that only serious harms are
caught by the prohibition. Second, “once a prima [facie] breach is found, the Panel
must go on to specifically balance freedom of expression against the particular
breach”.325 Apart from stating that an ‘Oakes analysis’ (such as was employed by the
BC Human Rights Tribunal in CJC) was not necessary unless the constitutional
validity of the legislation was challenged, it is not clear from the reasons of Rooke J.

321 Kane 3, supra note 318 at para. 10.
322 Ibid. at para. 67.
323 Ibid. at para. 70.
324 Ibid. at para. 73 (following Dickson C.J. in Taylor v. Canadian Human Rights Commission, supra
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what is involved in the ‘second step’ inquiry mandated by s.2(b), other than “an
examination of the nature of the statement in a full, contextual manner which
recognizes the objectives and goals of the legislation and is Charter sensitive”.326
On the meaning of the phrase “likely to expose...to hatred or contempt”
(question 5) Rooke J. first endorsed the Taylor327 interpretation of the harm threshold
established by the reference to “hatred or contempt”. In determining the meaning of
“likely to expose”, Justice Rooke considered and rejected the approach adopted by the
BC Human Tights Tribunal in CJC—which focused on whether the conduct was likely
to increase the risk of exposure to hatred or contempt—on the basis that this would set
too low a threshold:
The test proposed in CJC would admit of a breach where there is a 1%
chance of being exposed to hatred or contempt which is increased by
.01%. This would effectively allow a finding of a contravention of the
Act, despite that the target group is still not “likely” to be exposed to
hatred or contempt. I do not believe this is what is intended by the
Act.328
There is a certain irony in this observation. As discussed above, in CJC the BC
Human Rights Tribunal took great pains to interpret s.7 of the BC Human Rights Code
in a manner that was highly sensitive to the need to minimally infringe on free speech,
and yet the substance of Rooke J.’s criticism is that the Tribunal adopted an
interpretation of equivalent legislation which infringed too heavily on the right to
freedom of expression. This difference of opinion demonstrates that there is
considerable scope for divergence when it comes to the articulation and application of
free speech sensitivity while setting the parameters of legislative restrictions on hate
speech.
Rooke J. preferred to articulate an “analytical framework rather than a template
to be mechanically applied in every case”,329 but expressed approval of the following
test:
First, does the communication itself express hatred or contempt of a
person or group on a basis of one or more of the listed grounds? Would
a reasonable person, informed about the context, understand the
message as expressing hatred or contempt?

326 Ibid. at para. 85.
327 Supra note 4.
328 Kane 3, supra note 318 at para. 122.
329 Ibid. at para. 124.
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Second, assessed in its context, is the likely effect of the
communication to make it more acceptable to others to manifest hatred
or contempt against the person or group concerned? Would a
reasonable person consider it more likely than not to expose members
of the target group to hatred and contempt?330
It is interesting that even as he expressed doubts about the necessity of a single
‘test’, Rooke J. nonetheless felt compelled to spell out what he considered to be an
acceptable approach in just such terms. This tendency to rely heavily on legal ‘tests’
which substantially augment the wording of the legislation—a distinctive feature of a
number of the decisions handed down in recent years—appears to be a direct
consequence of the high degrees of ‘Charter consciousness’ and free speech
sensitivity that are associated with such determinations. However, it is not clear that
this heavily ‘legalistic’ approach is an effective device for achieving the balancing of
interests and values that is at the heart of the interpretation and application exercise.
The Alberta Human Rights and Citizenship Panel accepted that the opinion
provided by Rooke J. was binding. Turning to the facts of the case, the Panel found
that the article contained “a very powerful image or caricature that amounts to a
negative stereotype of Jewish people, more specifically of Jewish businessmen.”331
The message of the article went far beyond that of a failed business deal; the focus was
on the religion of Mr. Flanzbaum. The image conveyed was considered in the context
of the Jewish experience, which included, as LaForest J. had noted in the Supreme
Court of Canada’s decision in Ross v. New Brunswick School District No. 15,332 the
fact that Jews are “an historically disadvantaged group that has endured persecution on
the largest scale.”333 It was further noted “that many of the leading Charter cases on
freedom of expression and discrimination involve anti-Semitic communications.”334
According to the Panel, the article in question subtly reinforced a notion of Jews being
rich, powerful, and conspiring to control business to the exclusion of others.
The Panel observed that the fact that a publication contains anti-Semitic
messages does not necessarily mean that it conveys hatred or contempt as per s.2(1)(b)
of the Act. It held that although the article in the Alberta Report perpetuated a

330 Ibid. at para. 125.
331 Kane v. Alberta Report & Byfield (2002), online: Alberta Human Rights and Citizen Commission
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damaging stereotype of Jewish people, it did “not express the extreme level of
communication required to amount to hatred or contempt.”335 However it did “indicate
discrimination” and was therefore unlawful by virtue of s.2(1)(a) of the Act.336 The
Panel held that “the stereotype of Jews contained in the Article indicates
discrimination because it discloses a discriminatory belief or attitude that will
reinforce prejudice against them.”337
It is worth noting that the manner in which the phrase “indicates
discrimination” was interpreted and applied by the Panel338 established a relatively
low harm threshold. No actual act of discrimination or intention to discriminate is
required. The Panel need only be satisfied that the publication of the article would
“reinforce prejudice” against Jews which “has the potential of being translated into
discriminatory acts”.339 This appears to be at odds with the very high threshold
associated with the phrase “likely to expose…to hatred or contempt”. There was very
little consideration of what Charter or freedom of expression sensitivity might demand
with respect to the interpretation and application of s.2(1)(a) specifically,
notwithstanding that an adverse finding against a respondent in relation to s.2(1)(a)
carries the same potential consequences as an established breach of s.2(1)(b).
The Panel did, however, note that in reaching its overall decision it had
“carefully balanced the interests of freedom from discrimination and that of the
freedom of expression.…”340 It found that s.2(1) “is directed towards achieving such
pressing and sufficiently important objectives that it warrants limiting freedom of
expression in this case.”341 In the present case, the respondent’s freedom of expression
was minimally impaired—the respondents could have avoided the reach of the
restriction imposed by s.2(1) simply by excluding the final quotation (attributed to the
unnamed “professional planner”) from the article. The Panel made no order as to

335 Ibid.
336 Note that in Canadian Jewish Congress v. North Shore Free Press & Collins, supra note 250, the
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remedies, being satisfied that the respondents’ offer of space in the magazine in which
the complainants could raise their concerns was sufficient.
The Panel’s decision was overturned on appeal by the Alberta Court of
Queen’s Bench.342 Clark J. accepted the Alberta Report’s argument that the Panel had
erred in taking into account expert evidence presented in two British Columbia
decisions dealing with equivalent legislative provisions,343 without bringing this to the
attention of the parties and giving them an opportunity to make submissions in relation
to the admissibility of, or weight to be attached to, that evidence. Clark J. ordered that
the matter be remitted back to the Alberta Human Rights Panel for rehearing, but the
complaint was subsequently settled.
Johnson v. Music World344

Quintin Johnson lodged a complaint with the Alberta Human Rights and Citizenship
Commission in 1997 alleging that the respondents had breached s.2 (now s.3) of the
Human Rights, Citizenship and Multiculturalism Act by making available for purchase
a music CD by Deicide titled, “Upon the Cross” which contained a song called “Kill
the Christian”, and a CD by Type O Negative titled “Bloody Kisses” which contained
a song called “Kill All the White People”. Interestingly, the complaint was originally
dismissed by the Commission’s Director on the basis that subsection 2 “shielded the
material based on artistic merit”.345 However, this decision was overturned by the
Chief Commissioner in 2000, and the matter was referred to the panel for hearing.
After concluding that the retailers were appropriately named as respondents,
given that they had been responsible for displaying (even if not publishing) the CDs in
question, the panel moved on to consider the central issue before it: did the retailing of
the CDs indicate discrimination or an intention to discriminate against Christians
and/or “white” people; or was this conduct likely to expose Christians and/or “white”
people to hatred or contempt.
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Commission

Applying the approach endorsed by Rooke J. in Kane 3346, the panel ruled that
the sale of the CDs in question did not breach s.2(1), and so dismissed the complaint:
This panel finds that, while the content and tone of the
communications appear on the face of them to be discriminatory,
there is very little vulnerability of the target group. The expressions
used do not reinforce existing stereotypes, nor do the messages
appeal to well-publicized issues. More importantly, however, the
medium used to convey the message is extremely suspect, lacks
credibility and has a small circulation.…
It is the decision of this panel that there is very little likelihood of a
representation to expose a person or class of persons to hatred or
contempt in the context of this particular medium which is unlikely
to be taken seriously or credibly by the target group.347
In reaching its conclusion that the sale of the CDs in question did not breach
s.2, it is interesting to note that the Panel attached considerable significance to the fact
that ‘white’ and Christian Canadians are not, relatively speaking, vulnerable groups
when it comes to racism, religious intolerance, stereotyping, and discrimination. The
legislation is clearly not directed to minority groups only, but the decision in Johnson
does suggest that members of ethnic or religious majorities may be expected to endure
public conduct that, even though it expresses hatred or discriminatory attitudes, is
received into a context in which their dominant status means that negative
consequences for the group are unlikely. The Panel also attached significance to what
it described as the lack of credibility of the medium involved. It is not entirely clear
how the Panel defined the relevant medium—music CDs? heavy metal music CDs?
right wing fringe heavy metal CDs? It is questionable whether low-volume sales or the
niche market for a CD should determine whether the material is placed outside the
reach of a legislative restriction on public displays of material that promotes hatred or
contempt.
These two recent decisions from the Alberta Human Rights and Citizenship
Commission Panel provide further support for the argument advanced in this article
regarding the way in which free speech sensitivity has prompted adjudicators to give a
restrictive interpretation to the prohibition on communications which promote hatred
or contempt: in neither case was this threshold satisfied by the complainant. And yet,
we also see in the Panel’s decision in Kane 3 a flexible, relatively low threshold
346 Supra note 318.
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approach to the interpretation of the “indicates discrimination” branch of the hate
speech prohibition which seems paradoxical, but which is at the same time familiar,
being reminiscent of the approach adopted in cases like Sambo’s Pepperpot, Bramhill
and Arts Plus (discussed above).
4.2.5 The Interpretation of the ‘Hatred and Contempt’ Laws in Western Canada

In the last two decades, an alleged violation of a provincial human rights law
prohibition on conduct which promotes hatred or contempt towards identified groups
has been resolved by way of quasi-judicial or judicial adjudication on 10 occasions. In
five of these matters the complaint was upheld.348 At some time during the past 20
years the legislature in each of the provinces of western Canada has taken the decision
that the conventional prohibition on discriminatory signs and symbols is inadequate as
a legal mechanism for offering protection and an opportunity for redress to victims of
hate speech, and that a wider legislative prohibition was needed. The model of hate
speech regulation which currently operates in British Columbia, Alberta and
Saskatchewan, and which was recently adopted in the Northwest Territories, appears
to offer the promised enhanced protection, by applying to a wide range of methods of
communication, and by extending to conduct which promotes hatred and contempt, as
well as conduct which indicates discrimination.
However, in terms of evaluating whether the ‘hatred and contempt’ model of
hate speech regulation offers more effective protection to target groups, it is necessary
to look beyond the raw figure of a 50% complainant success rate in matters resolved
by adjudication. Close analysis of the decided cases reveals that despite the appearance
of a broader prohibition yielding higher quality protection, in practice, an ostensibly
broad prohibition has been interpreted relatively narrowly so that its scope is less than
might appear from the face of the legislation.
Certainly, there has been an expansion in the modes of communication covered
by the prohibition, reflected in the fact that in the majority of the decisions examined
above, the conduct in question was in the form of a newspaper opinion piece—a mode
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of communication which was not covered by the traditional Ontario model. However,
it is the other key dimension of the scope of a hate speech prohibition which has
turned out to be less expansive than targets of hate speech might have hoped for: the
harm threshold which must be satisfied before a complaint can be upheld. With a few
exceptions, decision-makers in all jurisdictions have tended to establish a high hurdle
that complainants must overcome in order to support a finding that the conduct in
question was likely to expose members of the target group to hatred or contempt. This
tendency towards the application of an elevated threshold has been manifested in
various ways, but the overwhelming motivation for this approach has been the concern
of adjudicators to limit the impact of hate speech prohibitions on the right to free
speech.
The net result of this pattern (which, it must be said, has not been universally
followed) is that, save for the fact that a broader range of methods of communication
are covered by the legislation, it is doubtful whether the residents of British Columbia,
Alberta and Saskatchewan enjoy a significantly higher quality of protection than their
fellow Canadians in those provinces and territories which continue to rely on the
traditional Ontario model prohibition on discriminatory signs and symbols.
5. CONCLUSION

This article has examined more than half a century of operation of provincial and
territorial hate speech laws in Canada. This examination has confirmed that free
speech sensitivity has long been an integral and enduring feature of the administration
and interpretation of legislative regimes for the regulation of hate speech—a finding
that should come as a shock to no-one. What is surprising is the way in which free
speech sensitivity has impacted on the operation of hate speech laws, and the effects of
that influence on the quality of the protection provided to victims by existing
provincial and territorial laws.
As expected, the constitutional jurisprudence surrounding s.2(b) of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms has provided an important reference-point
for the decision-making of provincial adjudicators in hate speech cases. However,
constitutional protection of the right to freedom of expression has not resulted in the
invalidation of provincial hate speech laws. Consistent with the principles and values
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endorsed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Keegstra349 and Taylor,350 restrictions
on hate speech in provincial human rights statutes have been regarded as a justifiable
restriction on the right protected by s.2(b) of the Charter.
But it is important to recognise that this is not the end of the story of the
influence of free speech sensitivity on provincial hate speech laws. One of the
important threads which runs consistently, even if not universally, through the history
of adjudication under provincial hate speech laws is a lingering unease about the
legitimacy of legislative restrictions on the communication of ideas—even ideas of
racism, homophobia or other forms of prejudice directed at a particular group. This
unease has been manifested in the preference of a number of judicial and quasi-judicial
decision-makers for a narrow construction of the scope of provincial hate speech
prohibitions, particularly in those jurisdictions where the legislature has expanded the
prohibition beyond the traditional, and reasonably innocuous, prohibition on
discriminatory signs and symbols. Even in cases where this approach has been taken,
some complainants have been able to satisfy the elevated threshold for establishing
that the conduct in question was unlawful. However, in a numbers of cases, the direct
effect of the raising of the legal threshold has been that the complainant, and the wider
community which the complainant represented, have been denied legal redress. In
terms of the more general and long-term impact, the tendency towards a narrow
construction of provincial hate speech prohibitions in public adjudications sends a
powerful symbolic message to the broader community about the practical breadth of
the category of protected speech upon which hate speech laws should not be permitted
to impinge.
This tendency towards a restrictive interpretation of hate speech prohibitions
is not universal. Beneath this dominant thread is a counter-tendency, observable in a
smaller number of cases, towards giving legislation a fuller or even expansive
definition, without apparent concern for the consequences for freedom of expression.
In fact, one of the surprising findings of this study is that in a context where the
jurisprudential landscape for the right to freedom of expression has been well
developed, particularly in the past 10 years, there is still a notable amount of
inconsistency and divergence amongst adjudicators with respect to central questions
about how similar legislative restrictions on hate speech should be interpreted in light
349 Supra note 3.
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of Charter and free speech sensitivities. This finding demonstrates that it by no means
follows that resolution of the legal (or constitutional) status of a set of values—in this
case, ‘free speech’—will put an end to wider moral and political debates about the
relative importance of those values.351 These considerations may be regarded as
‘non-legal’, but there can be little doubt that they exert a strong influence on the
decision-making process in the context of adjudications on alleged violations of hate
speech prohibitions.
Free speech sensitivity has exerted a powerful influence on the operation
(interpretation and application) of hate speech laws, with negative implications for the
level and quality of protection afforded to those individuals and groups in Canadian
society who suffer discrimination and other forms of harm by virtue of their identity.
This finding reveals that the practical relationship between the concept of ‘free speech’
(including legal rights, political values and rhetoric, and philosophical principles) and
hate speech laws is not merely determined at the level of the Supreme Court of
Canada’s Charter jurisprudence, but is constituted and reconstituted at the more
modest and less visible level of quasi-judicial and judicial decision-making under
provincial human rights laws.
One of the chief objectives of hate speech prohibitions in provincial and
territorial human rights statutes is to draw a line between free speech which must be
protected (or at least tolerated), and hate speech which must be outlawed and
sanctioned because of its harmful effects. Such line-drawing exercises are never
simple and almost always controversial. However, the extent of the uncertainty and
controversy has been exacerbated in Canada by the multi-layered influences of free
speech sensitivity described above, as well as ongoing differences amongst decisionmakers regarding the legitimate scope of hate speech prohibitions. The net result is
that the contours of unlawful hate speech in Canada are anything but sharp. On the
contrary, the boundary between free speech and hate speech remains contested and
fluid.

350 Supra note 4.
351 See Moon, supra note 13.
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